NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. J. WEINGARTEN, INC.—AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE NLRA SECTION 7 RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION by Fanning, John H.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 5 5 (1982-1983)
Issue 1 Article 1
1-1-1982
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. J.
WEINGARTEN, INC.—AN OVERVIEW OF
THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION
OF THE NLRA SECTION 7 RIGHT TO
REPRESENTATION
John H. Fanning
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
John H. Fanning, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. J. WEINGARTEN, INC.—AN OVERVIEW OF THE
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE NLRA SECTION 7 RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION, 5 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 1
(1982), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss1/1
Volume 5 
Issue I WESTERN NEW ENGLAND 
Summer LAW REVIEW 
1982 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
v. J. WEINGARTEN, INC.­




APPLICATION OF THE NLRA SECTION 7 

RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION 

JOHN H. F ANNING* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
InNLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,' the Supreme Court affirmed a 
holding of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) that an 
employer commits an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of 
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)2 by denying an em­
ployee's request for union representation at an investigatory inter­
view which the employee reasonably believes might result in 
disciplinary action.3 In reversing a decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had denied enforce­
• Member of the Rhode Island and United States Supreme Court Bars; A.B., 
Providence College; LL.B., Catholic University School of Law. Member of the National 
Labor Relations Board from 1957 to 1982, and Chairman of the Board from April 14, 
1977 to August 14, 1981. Member Fanning retired from the Board on December 16,1982 
after completing his fifth five-year term. He is happy to acknowledge the assistance of 
Edward Noonan in the preparation of this article. Mr. Noonan, a graduate of Brown 
University and the National Law Center, George Washington University, is a member of 
the Rhode Island and District of Columbia bars. 
I. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
2. 29 u.s.c. § 158(a)(I) (1976). Section 8(a)(I) states that it is an unfair labor 
practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise 
of the rights guaranteed in section [7] . . . ." 
3. 420 U.S. at 466-68. 
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ment of the Board's order in Weingarten ,4 the Supreme Court upheld 
the Board's construction of section 7 of the Act.S This construction 
acknowledges that the right of employees to engage in concerted ac­
tivity for mutual aid or protection encompasses the right of an em­
ployee not only to insist upon,6 but to have,7 the assistance of his 
union representative at such an interview. Specifically, the Court 
agreed with the Board's holding that an employer's denial of such a 
request interferes with, restrains, and coerces the employee in the 
exercise of his rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act. 
From the standpoint of a decisionmaker, Weingarten is signifi­
cant for its recognition of the Board's "responsibility to adapt the 
Act to changing patterns of industrial life. "8 While the Court noted 
that the Board's construction of section 7 was "newly arrived at"9 
and contrary to earlier Board precedent holding that section 7 pro­
vided employees no right to representation at investigatory inter­
views,1O the Court held, nevertheless, that such contrary precedent 
did not impair the validity of the Board's Weingarten holding. I I 
Noting that the Board has the "special function of applying the gen­
eral provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life," 12 the 
Court stated: 
The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach 
4. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973), enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135 
(5th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
5. 	 420 U.S. at 266-68. Section 7 provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec­
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right 
to refrain from any or an such activities except to the extent that such right may 
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment as authorized in Section [8](a)(3) . . .. 
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
6. ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975). In Quality Mfg., the Court, 
for the reasons stated in its Weingarten opinion, affirmed a finding by the Board that an 
employer violated section 8(a)(I) by disciplining an employee for refusing to attend an 
investigatory interview absent the requested union representative when the employee 
reasonably feared that the interview might result in discipline. Iff. at 280-81. For the 
NLRB's decision, see Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement denied in 
part, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975). 
7. See Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 
842 (7th Cir. 1973) (court found no concerted activity within meaning of the Act). 
8. 420 U.S. at 266. 	 . 
9. Iff. at 267. 
10. 	 Iff. at 264-65. 
II. 	 Iff. at 265. 
12. 	 Iff. at 266 (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963». 
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is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier decisions 
froze the development of this important aspect of the national la­
bor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decision 
making. "'Cumulative experience' begets understanding and in­
sight by which judgments ... are validated or qualified or invali­
dated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and 
fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates 
perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judi­
cial process."13 
The Court thus recognized the Board's duty to balance the com­
peting interests of employees and their employer when the Board is 
faced with a claim that a particular employer action restrained, co­
erced, or interfered with section 7 rights. In doing so, the Court also 
recognized the Board's authority to alter the balance of the compet­
ing interests in light of industrial developments. 
In the seven years since the Supreme Court's Weingarten deci­
sion, the Board has continued to interpret section 7 of the Act in the 
context of employee requests for representation at meetings in which 
the reasonable fear of disciplinary action obtains. In this article I 
shall present an overview of the Board's efforts in this area of the 
law. I shall discuss the origins and the evolution of the right to rep­
resentation, as well as the Board's post-Weingarten application of the 
right. In doing so, I hope to provide a view of the current status of 
the law and an awareness of the statutory policies which gave rise to 
the right. 
II. ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT 
The Board first faced the question of whether section 7 encom­
passed the right of an employee to refuse to deal with his employer 
without representation in Ross Gear and Tool Co. 14 In Ross Gear, 
the employer discharged a member of the bargaining committee for 
refusing to attend a meeting with management unaccompanied by 
her fellow committee members. The Board found that the purpose 
of the meeting was to discuss a matter that had been raised during 
collective bargaining negotiations and that the employee had been 
summoned, in part, because of her membership on the bargaining 
committee. IS Under such circumstances, the Board concluded that 
the employee was within her statutory rights to insist that the em­
13. 420 U.S. at 265-66 (quoting NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953». 
14. 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945), enforcement denied, 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947). 
15. Id. at 1034. 
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ployer deal with the whole committee, rather than her alone, and 
that the discharge therefore violated section 8(a)(l).I6 The Board's 
holding in Ross Gear clearly effectuated a statutory policy underly­
ing section 7 of the Act: In order to redress the imbalance of power 
between employers and employees, employees have the right to be 
represented by their collective bargaining agent in matters affecting 
terms and conditions of employment. However, the Board specifi­
cally distinguished the facts of the instant case, where the meeting 
had been called to discuss matters appropriate for the bargaining ta­
ble, from the case where an employee is summoned to a meeting 
held to admonish the employee for misconduct,l7 In the latter in­
stance, the employer's legitimate right to manage its business and 
impose discipline is an added weight to be balanced against the con­
commitant right of employees to act in concert to protect themselves 
against adverse employer action. 
In Dobbs House, Inc. 18 the Board addressed the issue of whether 
section 7 encompassed a right to representation during an interview 
from which disciplinary actions might result. There, the Board 
adopted a trial examiner's finding that the employer did not violate 
section 8(a)(I) by denying an employee's request that a union repre­
sentative be allowed to attend a meeting called for the purpose of 
discharging the employee for misconduct. 19 The trial examiner had 
stated: 
I fail to perceive anything in the Act which obliges an employer to 
permit the presence of a representative of the bargaining agent in 
every situation where an employer is compelled to admonish or to 
otherwise take disciplinary action against an employee, particu­
larly in those situations where the employee's conduct is unrelated 
to any legitimate union or concerted activity. An employer un­
doubtedly has the right to maintain day-to-day discipline in the 
plant or on the working premises and it seems to me that only 
exceptional circumstances should warrant any interference with 
this right.2o 
The trial examiner distinguished Ross Gear, noting that under the 
instant facts the employee "was discharged for cause and the dis­
charge conference was not predicated upon her involvement in any 
16. Id. The Board also found that discharge necessarily constituted discrimination 
which discouraged union membership in violation of section 8(a)(3). Id. 
17. Id. at \033-34. 
18. 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964). 
19. Id. at 157\. 
20. Id. 
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protected union activity."21 The decision in Dobbs House recog­
nized the legitimate right of an employer to impose discipline for 
misconduct. The decision, however, also limited the right to repre­
sentation to meetings where an employee was to be disciplined for 
concerted or union activities but did not address the full scope of 
activity adversely affected by the employer's denial of the represen­
tation request. For, it was by requesting or insisting upon union rep­
resentation that the employee exercised his section 7 rights. 
This fact was recognized in Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Di­
vision .22 There, the employee had been suspended for an alleged 
theft and was thereafter given the opportunity to meet with manage­
ment to defend himself. Before the meeting, the employee requested 
union representation and the union requested the right to be present. 
The Board found that the employer's denial of the employee's re­
quest violated section 7.23 The Board noted that the meeting was 
"not simply part of an investigation"24 and that the employee's at­
tendance was not solely to provide the company with information.25 
Rather, the Board viewed the meeting as one held in order for the 
company to conclude its case against the employee and provide a 
record to support disciplinary action.26 Given the nature of the 
meeting, the Board stated: 
Thus it is clear that on November 17 the Company sought to deal 
directly with [the employee] concerning matters affecting his terms 
and conditions of employment. Yet, as noted, the employees in 
the unit had selected the Union to deal with the [company] on 
such matters and there is no evidence that either [the employee]­
assuming he could have done so--<>r the Union had waived to any 
extent the right of representation or had agreed to channelize dis­
putes concerning such right into the procedures of the contract 
grievance provisions. Consequently, ... the [company's] refusal 
to respect [the employee's] request that the bargaining representa­
tive be permitted to represent him at the meeting interfered with 
and restrained him in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by Sec­
tion 7 of the Act,21 
The Board's reasoning was similar to that utilized in Ross Gear. 
21. Id 
22. 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969). 
23. Id at 362-63. 
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Once the Board had determined that discipline was a matter affect­
ing an employee's terms and conditions of employment, it followed 
that a represented employee had a right not to be compelled to deal 
with his employer alone, meaning that the employee had a right to 
be represented by the exclusive bargaining agent.28 This reasoning 
affected the development of the law in two significant ways. First, 
given that discipline was a term and condition of employment, it 
followed that not only did the employee have a right to be repre­
sented by the union, but that the employer had an affirmative obliga­
tion under section 8(a)(5)29 to meet with the union. In Texaco, the 
Board found that, in light of the employee's request for representa­
tion and the union's willingness to represent him, the employer's re­
fusal to deal with the union violated section 8(a)(5).30 Second, the 
Board was compelled to restrict the employee's right to representa­
tion and the union's right to represent the employee to interviews 
involving terms or conditions of employment. The Board, therefore, 
distinguished between interviews conducted solely for the purpose of 
gathering information and those which did not yet involve discipline 
from interviews in which a decision to discipline the employee had 
already been made.31 
In a number of post-Texaco cases, the Board adhered to the 
view that the right to representation attached only to disciplinary 
interviews and stemmed both from the employee's rights under sec­
tion 7 and the union's rights under section 8(a)(5).32 For example, in 
28. Id The reasoning employed by the Board should not be read as differentiating 
the section 7 rights of represented employees from those granted unrepresented employ­
ees. The Board in Texaco was faced with having to apply section 7 to a request for union 
representation. The Board found that the refusal to respect the request for representation 
was a restraint on rights guaranteed by section 7. Id The Board was not faced with, nor 
did it decide, whether a request for representation by an unrepresented employee like­
wise fell within the protective ambit of section 7. 
29. 29 U.S.C. § IS8(a)(S) (1976). Section 8(a)(S) provides that it is an unfair labor 
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees ...." Id 
30. 168 N.L.R.B. at 362. 
31. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's 
order in Texaco. Texaco Inc., Houston Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142 (Sth Cir. 
1969). However, it did so solely because it viewed the interview as investigatory rather 
than disciplinary. Id at 14S. Further, the Court characterized the section 7 right in­
volved as the right ofemployees "to bargain collectively through their chosen representa­
tives." Id at 144. Thus, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Board's investigatory/disciplinary 
distinction as well as its view that section 7 provides an employee a right to representa­
tion by his union in matters regarding terms and condition of his employment. 
32. See, e.g., Lafayette Radio Elecs. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491 (1971); Illinois Bell 
Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 834 (1971); United Aircraft Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 93S (1969), en­
forced, 440 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1971); Texaco Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal, 179 
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Chevron Oil CO.,33 the Board adopted a trial examiner's decision 
finding that an employer violated neither section 8(a)(l) nor section 
8(a)(5) by denying an employee's request for representation at a 
mere factfinding interview.34 Similarly, in Dayton TYpographical 
Service, Inc. ,35 the Board adopted a trial examiner's dismissal of an 
alleged section 8(a)(I) violation that was based on the denial of a 
request for union representation at a purely investigatory interview. 
Relying on both Texaco and Chevron Oil, the trial examiner con­
cluded that 
only where an employee as is called in discussion with manage­
ment on a problem involving his performance, which has gone 
beyond the fact finding or investigatory state to a point where 
management has decided that discipline of that specific employee 
is appropriate, that the Employer is required on demand of either 
the employee or his bargaining agent to permit that agent to be 
present.36 
The next significant development in the evolution of the right to 
representation occured in Quality Manufacturing CO.37 There a ma­
jority38 of the Board found that section 7 guaranteed a right to repre­
sentation on a basis distinct from that found to exist in Texaco, one 
which rendered irrelevant any distinction between investigatory and 
disciplinary interviews.39 The employee in. Quality ManufactUring 
N.L.R.B. 976 (1969); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 839 (1969), enforced, 426 F.2d 1328 
(6th Cir. 1970); Dayton Typographic Serv., 176 N.L.R.B. 357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson 
Ford Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967). 
33. 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967). 
34. The trial examiner stated: 
To be sure, [s]ection 7 of the Act guarantees to employees the right to be 
represented by their collective-bargaining representative in all areas pertaining 
to their terms and conditions of employment, and the penalty of suspension 
from work for alleged insubordination most assuredly is encompassed within 
those terms and conditions. Moreover, [s]ections 9(a) and 8(a)(5) obligate an 
employer to deal with a duly designated labor organiZation concerning all mat­
ters which affect the employment tenure of the represented employees. But this 
is not to say that a bargaining agent must be privy to management councils, or 
that represented employees must be shielded by that agent from company in­
quiries, on each and every occasion when management embarks upon an inves­
tigation to ascertain whether plant discipline has been breached. 
Id at 578. 
35. 176 N.L.R.B. 357 (1969). 
36. Id at 361. 
37. 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement denied in part, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 
1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975). 
38. Former Chairman Miller, Member Fanning, and Member Jenkins composed 
the majority. Former Member Kennedy dissented in part. 
39. Id at 198. 
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was suspended and then discharged for refusing to attend an investi­
gatory interview without union representation.40 Further, one union 
steward was suspended and another was suspended and discharged 
for insisting upon representing the employee.41 Despite the fact that 
the interview was investigatory in nature, the Board found that the 
employee's discharge violated section 8(a)(l).42 In doing so, the 
Board first distinguished Texaco and the cases based thereon as in­
volving only the issue of whether an employer's denial of a request 
for representation violated its duty to bargain with the union under 
section 8(a)(5).43 The Board noted that none of those cases involved 
a "situation where an employee or his representative had been disci­
plined or discharged for requesting, or insisting on, union represen­
tation in the course of an interview."44 Further, according to the 
majority, those cases had not directly considered the section 7 right 
of individual employees to act in concert "for mutual aid or 
protection."45 
What led the Board to characterize Texaco and its progeny as 
limited solely to the union's right to represent the employee under 
section 8(a)(5) was the Board's adoption of a new view of the em­
ployee's request in terms of the guarantees of section 7. In Texaco, 
the employee's request was seen as the exercise of the right to be 
represented by one's union in matters affecting terms and conditions 
of employment.46 Such right stemmed from the section 7 guarantee 
that employees had the right to bargain with their employer through 
representatives of their own choosing.47 In Quality Manufacturing, 
however, the Board viewed the employee's insistence upon represen­
tation not as a refusal to deal individually with the employer over a 
bargainable matter but rather as concerted activity for mutual aid or 
protection.48 This new view rendered meaningless any distinction 
between investigatory and disciplinary interviews insofar as the em­
ployee's section 7 rights were concerned. Since through the request 
the employee sought protection or aid against employer action, it 
was no longer necessary that the interview involve an actual term or 
condition of employment; a potential that the employee's continued 
40. 195 N.L.R.B. at 197-98. 
41. fd. 
42. fd. at 199. 
43. fd. at 198. 
44. fd. 
45. fd. 
46. 168 N.L.R.B. at 362. 
47. fd. 
48. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-99. 
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employment or working condition would be adversely affected as a 
result of the interview was sufficient.49 The Board thus stated: 
After reflection, we have concluded that it is a serious violation of 
an employee's individual right to be represented by his union if he 
can only request or insist on such representation under penalty of 
disciplinary action. And while the employer's denial of such re­
quest may not derogate the bargaining rights of the union, in vio­
lation of Section 8(a)(5), in the case of a purely investigatory 
interview, this is not to say either: (a) that the employer may dis­
cipline the employee for demanding representation; or (b) that 
the employer may insist, by threatening to discipline the em­
ployee's representative, that the interview be held without his 
presence.50 
Having found that an employee engages in concerted activity 
for mutual aid or protection by requesting or insisting upon union 
representation at an investigatory interview,51 the Board, in Quality 
Manufacturing, proceeded to balance this right against the em­
ployer's legitimate interests and prerogatives in investigating miscon­
duct. The Board held that the right applied only to interviews in 
which the employee had a reasonable ground to believe that the in­
terview would adversely affect his working conditions. 52 In further 
recognition of the employer's interest, the Board noted that the em­
ployer, when faced with a request for representation, was under no 
obligation to conduct the interview. 53 Rather, the employer could in­
form the employee that no interview would be conducted unless the 
employee was willing to attend unrepresented.54 The employer 
could thus "reject a collective course in situations such as investiga­
49. Later, the Board applied the "mutual aid or protection" analysis to requests for 
representation at disciplinary interviews. Certified Grocers, 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), 
enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978); see infra text accompanying notes 117­
34. 
50. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198. The Board in Quality Mj'g. also found that the discipline 
of the union stewards violated section 8(a)(I) as the discipline stemmed from the stew­
ards' attempts to perform their duties as union officials by representing the employee. Id 
at 199. 
51. Compare Emerson Elec. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 346 (1970) with Quality Mfg. Co., 
195 N.L.R.B. at 199 n.7 (distinguishing Emerson Elec. on its facts). 
52. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-99. The Board stated that "reasonable ground" would be 
determined by objective standards under all the circumstances in the case. Id at 198 n.3. 
It also stated that the right would not apply to run-of-the-mill shop floor conversations 
such as the giving of instructions, counselling, or correction of work technique, where no 
reasonable ground existed for the employee to believe that discipline would result. Id at 
19~ .. 
53. Id 
54. See id 
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tory interviews where a collective course is not required"55 while the 
employee was still guaranteed his right to protection by his chosen 
representatives. The Board noted that, with participation in the in­
terview being voluntary, the employee risked losing whatever benefit 
might result from the interview and that the employer was free to act 
upon whatever information it had absent the interview. 56 
In Quality Manufacturing, the employee had been disciplined 
because she exercised a section 7 right-the insistence upon repre­
sentation by her union. In Mobil Oil Corp. ,57 the Board extended its 
holding in Quality Manufacturing, finding that the section 7 right to 
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection also barred 
an employer from conducting an investigatory interview after deny­
ing the employee's request.58 In Mobil Oil, the employees involved 
had a reasonable fear of discipline but did not refuse to attend the 
investigatory interviews. Rather, at the employer's insistence, each 
employee attended the interview after his individual request for rep­
resentation was denied. The Board noted, as it had in Quality Manu­
facturing, that the employer had the right to offer each employee the 
option of attending the interview without representation or foregoing 
the benefit of any interview. But to compel the employee to attend 
the interview unassisted constituted, according to the Board, "un­
warranted interference" with the employee's section 7 right to "insist 
on concerted protection, rather than individual self-protection, 
against possible adverse employer action."59 
The Board's view that section 7 provided a right to union repre­
sentation at investigatory interviews which an employee reasonably 
feared would result in discipline was met with disagreement when 
the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits denied 
enforcement inNLRB v. Quality Manufacturing Co. ,60 and Mobil Oil 
55. Id at 198. 
56. Id at 199. 
57. 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973). 
The same panel that constituted the majority on Quality Mfg. , Former Chairman Miller, 
Member Fanning and Member Jenkins, decided the Mobil Oil case. Former Member 
Kennedy, as he had in Quality Mfg. , dissented. 
58. Id 
59. Id The Board took the opportunity to emphasize that, while the employee had 
an individual right under section 7 to union representation at an investigatory interview, 
the union had no particular right to represent the employee other than that which it 
could obtain through collective bargaining. Id The Board thus continued to distinguish 
between investigatory and disciplinary interviews insofar as the union's rights under sec­
tion 8(a)(5) were concerned. 
60. 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975). 
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Corp. v. NLRB ,61 respectively, on this issue. In Quality Manufactur­
ing, the Fourth Circuit found that the Board's construction of sec­
tion 7 was contrary to the Texaco line of cases, holding that no right 
to representation existed at investigatory interviews.62 
The Seventh Circuit, in Mobil 011, correctly noted that the 
Board's decision had not been based on the section 7 right of em­
ployees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, as had been the case in Texaco. Nevertheless, it found 
that the section 7 right to act in concert for mutual aid or protection 
was not so broad as to encompass a right to union representation at 
investigatory interviews where the employee reasonably feared 
discipline.63 
In Weingarten, the Supreme Court resolved the issue, holding 
that the Board's construction of section 7, though not required was at 
least, permissible under the Act. 64 In its decision, the Court first set 
out the section 7 right to representation as it had been developed by 
the Board in Quality Manufacturing and Mobil Oil. First, the right 
only arises in situations where the employee requests representation 
and has a reasonable belief that the investigation will result in disci­
61. 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973). 
62. 481 F.2d at 1024-25. The court criticized the Board for failing to cite any legis­
lative history or present "persuasive analysis of the statutory provisions" in support of its 
holding. Id at 1025. In regard to the Board's previous decisions, the court stated: 
[T]he Board has no power to alter or rearrange employer-employee relations to 
suit its every whim. Rather, the Board can only determine whether the Act has 
been violated. And it would appear that in the entire history of the law. . . the 
management prerogative of conducting an investigatory interview such as 
Quality attempted here has not been considered a violation of the Act. 
Id 
63. 482 F.2d at 847-48. The court found that the Board's construction of section 7 
was based solely on the literal wording thereof rather than on underlying statutory pol­
icy. Finding that the basic thrust of section 7 is to enable employees to organize and 
apply economic pressure against their employers, the court stated: 
In our opinion, economic pressure may properly be applied to compel employ­
ers to follow acceptable investigatory procedures, or to determine the conse­
quences of various kinds of misconduct, but economic pressure should not be a 
component of the fact-finding process itself. The requested Union representa­
tion at an investigatory interview is clearly not the kind of "concerted activity" 
with which § 7 is primarily concerned. 
Id at 847. 
64. 420 U.S. at 266-67. The Board had found, relying on Mobil Oil, that the em­
ployer violated section 8(a)(I) by conducting an investigatory interview after denying the 
employee's request for union representation. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 449, 
enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the interview was a pre­
mature stage at which to invoke a requirement of union representation where the pur­
pose of the interview did not involve the imposition of disciplinary proceedings), rev'd, 
420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
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pline.65 Second, the exercise of the employee's right may not inter­
fere with -legitimate employer prerogatives, meaning that the 
employer was under no obligation to conduct the interview. Since 
the union derived no rights from the employee's exercise of his indi­
vidual section 7 right, the employer did not have to bargain with the 
union representative during any interview.66 
Having set forth the contours and limits67 of the right, the Court 
proceeded to explicate its basis. It found that an employee's request 
for union representation during an investigatory interview fell within 
the literal wording of the section 7 phrase "concerted activities . . . 
for mutual aid or protection," despite the fact that only the individ­
ual employee had an immediate stake in the outcome of the investi­
gation. The Court, instead, viewed the request as concerted activity 
because the union representative would safeguard the interests of all 
unit employees against unjust disciplinary procedures and his pres­
ence would assure all employees that they could also have his assist­
ance if called to an investigatory interview.68 The Court also noted 
that the Board's construction of section 7 effectuated the most funda­
mental policy of the Act: the elimination of the imbalance of power 
between employers and employees.69 By requesting union repre­
sentation, the employee was in effect seeking the aid and protection 
of his fellow employees against adverse employer action. The 
Board's holding that section 7 accorded employees the right to such 
representation was, according to the Court, "within the protective 
ambit of that section 'read in light of the mischief to be corrected and 
the end to be attained.' "70 
III. POST WEINGARTEN DEVELOPMENTS 
The Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten left open a 
number of important subsidiary questions regarding the section 7 
right to representation: While the right attaches to interviews in 
which the reasonable fear of discipline obtains, what sort of ex­
change or confrontation between an employer and an employee, in 
terms of both extent and purpose, constitutes such an interview? 
Since an employee must request representation, what constitutes a 
sufficient request? Given that exercise of the Weingarten right need 
65. 420 U.S. at 257. 
66. Id. at 258-59. 
67. Id. at 260. 
68. Id. at 260-61. 
69. Id. at 262. 
70. Id. at 262 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. Ill, 124 (1944». 
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not transform the interview into an adversary contest, what is the 
proper role of the representative and to what extent can the em­
ployer place limitations on that role? What is the proper remedy for 
a violation of the Weingarten right? 
In a number of post-Weingarten decisions, the Board has ad­
dressed these and other questions, continually defining the "contours 
and limits" of the section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for 
mutual aid or protection as it relates to employer-employee ex­
changes which present the potential for discipline. 
A. The «Interview" 
1. The Requirement of an "Exchange" 
The section 7 right affirmed in Weingarten requires some sort of 
exchange between employer and employee that may affect the em­
ployee's terms and conditions of employment. Thus, the Board has 
recognized the fact that not all meetings between an employer and 
employees involving discipline or the potential thereof rise to the 
level of an "interview" for purposes of the Weingarten right. For 
example, the Board has held that an employer can summarily warn, 
discipline, or pink slip an employee without having to provide a rep­
resentative.71 Such action merely represents the ministerial act of 
imposing discipline without any exchange or discussion during 
which the assistance of a representative could be sought or rendered. 
Further, the Weingarten right as affirmed by the Supreme Court is 
expressly limited by the employer's prerogative to forego the inter­
view and impose discipline on the basis of whatever information it 
has before it, rather than comply with a request for representation. 
This limitation had been imposed in United States Gypsum,72 a pre­
Weingarten decision. There, the Board adopted a trial examiner's 
decision finding that an employer had lawfully denied an employee's 
request for a union representative when the employee was admon­
ished in a supervisor's office regarding an exchange with his fore­
man. The trial examiner noted that the employee was asked no 
questions, that no suggestion was made, "either expressly or by im­
plication," that he admit or deny any accusation, or give assurance 
that the alleged offense would not be repeated.73 The limitation has 
also been followed in post-Weingarten decisions. Thus, inAmoco Oil 
71. Amoco Oil Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 551, 552 (1978). 
72. 200 N.L.R.B. 305 (1972). 
73. Id. at 308. 
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Co. ,74 the Board held that an employer did not unlawfully deny an 
employee's request where the employer "confined himself to a single 
sentence informing [the employee] of his suspension" and made "no 
attempt to question him, engage in any manner of dialogue, or par­
ticipate in any other interchange which could be characterized as an 
interview."75 These decisions merely represent the fact that a pre­
requisite to the attachment of any right is the opportunity for its 
exercise. 
The Board has also limited the application of the Weingarten 
right to meetings between an employer and employee which, by their 
nature, allow for an "exchange." In United States Postal Service,76 
the Board found that the right to representation did not attach to a 
"fitness for duty" medical examination.77 The Board found that the 
"hands on" examination involved therein did not "meet with . . . 
the tests set forth in the Weingarten line of cases, or the rationale 
underlying these tests which envision a confrontation between the 
employer and employee."78 The Board also noted that, given the 
nature of a physical examination, the employer did not have the op­
tion of proceeding on its own and independently acquiring the infor­
mation it needed.79 Significantly, however, the Board refused to pass 
on whether the Weingarten right attached to any "interview" portion 
of a medical examination which could result in action adverse to an 
employee's interests or affect his terms and conditions of 
employment.80 
The requirement that the confrontation between the employer 
and employee include an exchange, as opposed to the physical exam­
ination of a person or documents without any attendant questioning 
or discussion, is consistent with the statutory policies underlying the 
Weingarten right. For unlike a questioning or other exchange, 
where explanations and mitigating factors can be proffered, where 
arguments can be made and minds changed, and where an em­
ployee's position can be defended, a physical examination does not 
74. 238 N.L.R.B. 551 (1978). See also K-Mart Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 855 (1979). 
75. 238 N.L.R.B. at 552. But if. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757 (1977) 
(employee has right to union representation at counseling sessions with employer in 
which employee's work performance is discussed), enforcement denied in part, 587 F.2d 
403 (9th Cir. 1978). 
76. 252 N.L.R.B. 61 (1980). 
77. Id. at 64-65. 
78. Id. at 61. 
79. Id. In this regard, however, see Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 251 N.L.R.B. 
1591 (1980), enforcement denied, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1981). 
80. 252 N.L.R.B. at 61. 
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present a perceived threat which is capable of being countered by 
concerted action. 
2. The Nature and Purpose of the "Interview" 
Determination of the type of discussion or interchange that 
should give rise to the section 7 right to representation is more com­
plex than determination of whether an interview has taken place at 
all. Clearly, the interview must present some potential for action ad­
verse to the employee's job interests. It can be argued, however, that 
every time a supervisor talks with an employee there exists a poten­
tial for discipline, whether as a function of the subject matter of the 
discussion, meaning past or present misconduct or performance, or 
merely as a result of what transpires during the discussion. There­
fore, a distinction must be made between those employer-employee 
meetings which present a real, discernible potential for disciplinary 
action and those in which the potential is, at best, remote. The exer­
cise of the Weingarten right has thus been limited to those employer­
employee meetings in which the employee has a reasonable fear of 
discipline. Generally, whether a reasonable fear of discipline at­
taches to any interview or discussion is determined by the circum­
stances of each case,8l however, certain types of discussions, by their 
very nature, have been found not to give rise to a reasonable fear. 
In Quality Manufacturing, the Board excepted from the section 7 
right to representation the "run-of-the-mill shop floor conversations 
as, for example, the giving of instruction or training or needed cor­
rections of work techniques."82 While such conversations could con­
ceivably result in discipline sometime in the future, they are more a 
part of the act of supervision than something that could reasonably 
be perceived as the employer's investigatory or disciplinary process. 
As such, the need of an employer to engage in day-to-day supervi­
sion of employees clearly outweighs the employee's need for assist­
ance with regard to such conversations. One can only imagine the 
havoc that would occur in the workplace if an employer were re­
quired to accede to a request for representation each time a supervi­
sor attempted to instruct or criticize an employee in the normal 
course of his duties. 
The Board has also excepted from the application of the Wein­
garten right other types of employer-employee meetings or ex­
changes which, like the "run-of-the-mill shop floor discussion," are 
81. Id at 63. 
82. 195 N.L.R.B. at 199. 
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not "calculated to form the basis for taking disciplinary or other job­
affecting actions against [employees] for past misconduct."83 In Yel­
low Freight Systems, Inc. ,84 the Board adopted an administrative law 
judge's finding that Weingarten did not apply to a confrontation be­
tween an employee and his superiors over a job assignment, a con­
frontation that resulted in the employee's termination. In Yellow 
Freight, the employee, a truck driver, refused to take an assigned run 
because he believed that to do so would violate federal regulations.85 
During a twenty-minute discussion over whether federal regulations 
did, in fact, permit his acceptance of the run, the employee allegedly 
requested and allegedly was denied, the assistance and presence of 
his union representative.86 The administrative law judge found that 
assuming, arguendo, the employee had requested representation, the 
discussion did not fall within the purview of Weingarten since it was 
neither an investigatory nor disciplinary interview.87 The adminis­
trative law judge also noted that the employee had sought the assist­
ance of his representative not as a means of guarding against 
possible discipline, but only to assist him in clarifying his job 
duties.88 
Recently, a Board majority held that Weingarten rights did not 
attach to a meeting called to read plant rules to employees. In North­
west Engineering Co., 89 the employer, in response to what it per­
ceived as a work slowdown, called a meeting of crew members. At 
that meeting the employer distributed and read aloud its plant rules, 
pointed out what it considered to be rules violations, and referred to 
certain employees as rules violators.9o In reversing the administra­
83. 252 N.L.R.B. at 61. 
84. 247 N.L.R.B. 177 (1980). 
85. It!. at 179. 
86. It!. 
87. It!. at 182. 
88. It!. That section 7 rights may therefore have attached to the confrontation in a 
context other than that contemplated by Weingarten was not placed before, or decided 
by, the Board. For example, it could be argued that the section 7 right to engage in 
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection encompassed the right of the employee 
to the assistance of his union agent for the purpose of pressing his claim to management 
during the disagreement over the proper interpretation of the collective bargaining agree­
ment. Cf. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967) (concerted activ­
ity may include filing complaints for solely personal reasons). Such "representation" 
however, would not, as in Weingarten, be sought for the purpose of seeking protection 
against a perceived threat to the employee's job interests. 
89. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,311, at 26,013 (Oct. 22, 
1982). Chairman Van de Water, Member Fanning and Member Zimmerman composed 
the majority. Members Jenkins and Hunter dissented. 
90. It!., 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,013-14. 
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tive law judge's finding that the employer unlawfully denied an em­
ployee's request that a union representative be allowed to attend the 
meeting, the majority found that the meeting was informational only 
and that no discipline was either contemplated or meted out in re­
gard to the work slowdown.91 Emphasizing that the exercise of the 
Weingarten right should not interfere with legitimate employer pre­
rogatives, the Board stated: 
Weingarten rights do not arise simply because an employer calls a 
meeting of its employees to discuss a perceived problem in the 
way its employees are carrying out their duties. Work perform­
ance is a matter of legitimate concern to an employer. An em­
ployer surely retains the prerogative of calling a meeting of a 
group of employees, at which no disciplinary action is contem­
plated or taken, simply to advise them of the employer's valid 
work performance expectations and to inform them of the possible 
consequences of noncompliance, without invoking the spectre of 
Weingarten .92 • 
Nor was the character of the meeting changed, according to the ma­
jority, by the fact that the employees were put on notice that future 
violations of its rules could lead to discipline.93 The Weingarten 
rights, it admonished, "is not concerned with employees having rea­
son to believe that discipline will be imposed for future offenses; it 
relates to past conduct for which employees fear the imposition of 
current sanctions."94 
The Board requires that an employer-employee meeting be rea­
sonably seen as forming the basis for taking disciplinary action over 
past misconduct before the meeting will be held to give rise to a rea­
sonable fear of discipline. The Board's position represents a balance 
between the employee's need for protection against the employer 
and the employer's right to engage in the day-to-day management of 
its business by direction and supervision of its employees. The Wein­
garten right, despite its importance, should come into play only 
when the prospect of discipline is realistic, as evidenced by an ex­
change concerning the imposition of discipline or subject matter for 
which discipline might be imposed. This limitation, however, does 
not mean that the Weingarten right applies only to meetings or ex­
changes that are part of an employer'sformal disciplinary or investi­
91. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,014. 
92. Id (footnote omitted). 
93. Id 
94. Id See a/so Stewart-Warner Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 136, 161 (1980). q: Ball 
Plastics Division, Ball Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 971 (1981). 
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gatory process. Once circumstances giving rise to a reasonable fear 
of discipline are present, it matters not where or when the exchange 
takes place or the manner in which it is conducted.95 Nor should the 
limitation that an employer-employee meeting must be calculated or 
intended to form the basis for a possible disciplinary decision be 
read to require that such purpose must exist prior to the meeting. 
Confrontations or meetings may, during their course, change focus 
and the right of an employee to protect his job interests through con­
certed activity for mutual aid or protection should not depend on 
whether a meeting, which in fact presents a reasonable fear of disci­
pline, was not originally intended or calculated to do so. 
The requirement that the employer-employee exchange present 
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable fear of discipline is an im­
portant aspect of the Weingarten right. Whether a reasonable fear of 
discipline exists in regard to any employer-employee meeting is de­
termined by "objective standards under all the circumstances of the 
case"96 and not by the employee's subjective state of mind. It is im­
portant to note, however, that "all the circumstances" are not limited 
to those existing before or at the outset of the meeting. Rather, they 
include the meeting itself which, depending on its nature, extent, or 
purpose, may render irrelevant concerns that would otherwise be a 
reasonable fear of discipline on the part of the employee. Northwest 
Engineering serves as an illustration of this point. There, the em­
ployee requesting the presence of the union agent at the outset of the 
meeting did so under circumstances which, it could be argued, sup­
ported a reasonable fear of discipline on the part of the employee. 
However, given the fact that the employer, having denied the request 
for representation, did not engage in any conduct which, in fact, con­
cerned discipline over past misconduct, the employee's original fears, 
reasonable or not, were viewed by the majority as irrelevant.97 In 
answering the assertion made by dissenting Members Jenkins and 
Hunter, that the employer was not privileged to deny the request for 
representation made by an employee who had a reasonable fear of 
discipline in regard to the upcoming meeting,98 the majority stated: 
95. See, e.g., AAA Equip. Servo Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 390 (1978), enforcement denied, 
598 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1979). The Board has found, however, that "location of an inter­
view is one of the contributing factors in determining whether, under all of the circum­
stances of a particular case, an employee reasonably believed that an interview might 
result in his discipline." General Elec. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 479, 481 n.12 (1979). 
96. NLRB V. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 257 n.5; Quality Mfg. Co., 195 
N.L.R.B. at 198 n.3. 
97. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,015. 
98. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,017. 
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The dissent errs in focusing exclusively on [the employees] fear 
without taking into account the context of the meeting and its 
stated purpose. An employee's fear of discipline cannot by itself 
convert a meeting into a disciplinary or investigatory exercise. If 
the meeting is not intended to be and in fact is not concerned with 
discipline or an investigation into employee conduct, and the em­
ployee is made aware of this either before or at the meeting, the 
employee's fear to the contrary is immaterial.99 
The above is nothing more than a recognition of the fact that it 
is the employer who controls the purpose, course, and extent of any 
meeting and, therefore, it is the employer's actions that will deter­
mine both whether an interview has taken place and whether Wein­
garten rights attach to the interview. The corollary to this point is 
that an employer denying a request for representation with regard to 
any confrontation, in which an employee reasonably fears discipline, 
acts at its peril if it fails to avoid a discussion to which section 7 
rights would attach. 
The situation in which the actual conduct or purpose of a meet­
ing renders irrelevant a reasonable fear on the part of the employee 
should, however, be contrasted with the situation in which the em­
ployee acts on the basis of a reasonable fear and refuses to partici­
pate absent the granting of his request. 100 In the former situation, it 
cannot be determined whether the employee's section 7 right has 
been restrained or coerced until the confrontation is over and its pur­
pose and extent is analyzed in terms of section 7 guarantees. In the 
latter situation, whether the confrontation or meeting presents a rea­
sonable fear of discipline must be determined by the circumstances 
at the time of refusal and if such reasonable fear exists, the intended 
purpose of the meeting or the course the meeting would have taken 
is irrelevant. This follows from the fact that the employee who re­
fuses to participate on the basis of a reasonable fear of discipline is 
seeking mutual aid or protection against a perceived threat and his 
section 7 right to do so does not, ultimately, depend on the correct­
ness of his perception. Rather, since the employer controls the pur­
pose and the extent of the exchange, the burden shifts to the 
employer should he choose to proceed, to assure the employee that 
his fear however reasonable is unjustified and that no discipline will 
result. 101 
99. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,017 n.4. 
100. See, e.g., ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975). 
101. The Board has found such assurances significant in determining whether cer­
tain meetings required that requests for representation be granted. See Lennox Indus., 
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The Board has also interpreted the Weingarten right as it ap­
plies to meetings or interviews which, while concerning employment 
or discipline, occur after the employment relationship has been sev­
ered. In such meetings, the issue arises as to whether an ex-em­
ployee may invoke Weingarten rights. In Polson Industries, 102 the 
Board adopted an administrative law judge~s finding that no section 
7 rights to representation applied to a meeting held to discuss an 
employee's voluntary termination. 103 The administrative law judge 
found that the meeting had overtones of an investigatory interview 
in that the management officials present could have altered the ex­
employee's status by reinstating him. 104 However, given the fact that 
the employee himself had terminated the employment relationship, 
the administrative law judge reasoned: 
To hold Weingarten applicable in the situation would expand the 
rule to the point of making it applicable not only to employees 
who reasonably expect to be disciplined as a result of the inter­
. view but also to applicants for employment who also can expect 
their employment status to be affected by the outcome of the 
interview. lOS 
As the employee in Polson had voluntarily severed the employ­
ment relationship, the meeting therein concerned discipline only in 
the sense that a decision not to rehire an ex-employee could be so 
construed. The administrative law judge therefore correctly found 
that the employee was nothing more than an applicant who had no 
statutory right to compel the presence of a representative at the 
meeting. 106 Discharged employees, it could be argued, should be 
viewed differently by virtue of the fact that the meeting would neces­
sarily concern reconsideration of the employer's decision to termi­
nate the employment relationship: discipline in the sense 
contemplated by Weingarten. However, Weingarten involves an em­
ployer's prevention of the exercise of concerted activity for mutual 
aid protection. Although the right to engage in such activity is 
granted to employees in general, its exercise in the Weingarten con­
text is only relevant as to active employees of the employer. 107 It is 
244 N.L.R.B. 607 (1979), enforced, 637 F.2d 340 (5th Cir., Unit A 1981); General Elec. 
Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 479 (1979); Amoco Chern. Corp. 237 N.L.R.B. 394 (1978). 
102. 242 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1979). 
103. Id 
104. Id at 1212. 
105. Id 
106. Id 
107. Applicants and ex-employees are employees under section 2(3) of the Act in 
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the lack of active employee status that precludes any distinction be­
tween employees who have been discharged, employees who have 
quit, and applicants in regard to their ability to compel the em­
ployer, as a function of section 7, to allow for the exercise of con­
certed activity on his property. Thus, in Party Cookies, 108 the Board 
adopted an administrative law judge's decision holding that a dis­
charged employee had no section 7 right to representation at a meet­
ing held subsequent to his discharge. 109 
That Weingarten rights do not attach to meetings held subse­
quent to but concerning an employee's discharge is supported by the 
fact that a discharged employee cannot, in any reading of Wein­
garten, be compelled to attend a post-discharge meeting. Although 
the discharged employee may feel obligated to attend a post-dis­
charge meeting for fear that the discipline will not receive favorable 
reconsideration, he does not act out of a fear that his current status 
will be adversely affected. Unlike the active employee, a discharged 
employee cannot fear that his refusal to abide by his employer's 
wishes may result in his losing that which he has already lost; only 
that he may not regain that which he has already lost. I 10 
3. The Investigatory-Disciplinary Distinction 
In its Weingarten opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that, 
under the Texaco line of cases, the Board had found a statutory right 
to union representation during disciplinary interviews. I I I As previ­
ously discussed, I 12 that right ran to the employee under the section 7 
guarantee that employees have the right to bargain through repre­
sentatives of their own choosing and to the union, under the em-
that they are protected from discrimination or retaliation for union related or other con­
certed activity which they have engaged in, or might engage in, as employees of a partic­
ular employer. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). While a refusal to 
hire, however, may constitute discrimination within the meaning of section 8(a)(3) of the 
Act, or, by the message the refusal sends, restrain or coerce the section 7 rights of active 
employees of the employer, it does not follow that section 7 requires an employer to 
allow individuals who are not his employees a range of rights that have meaning only in 
the job context. 
108. 237 N.L.R.B. 612 (1978). 
109. Id 
110. It should be noted that the discussion herein relates only to whether the sec­
tion 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection attaches to such 
meetings between an employer and an ex-employee. Since such a meeting could have 
grievance ramifications, a union may have rights in regard thereto either under section 
8(a)(5) or section 9(a) of the Act. See infra text accompanying notes 135-60 for a discus­
sion of Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979). 
111. 420 U.S. at 260. 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 18-36. 
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ployer's section 8(a)(5) obligation to bargain in good faith. As also 
discussed,l13 the rationale of Texaco required differentiation be­
tween those interviews involving discipline and, therefore, a bargain­
ing obligation, and those possibly leading to, but not yet involving 
discipline-investigatory interviews. Unfortunately, few interviews 
between employers and employees lend themselves readily to classi­
fication as purely investigatory or disciplinary.114 In many inter­
views that could otherwise be termed investigatory, discipline is not 
postponed until a later date but is imposed after questioning is com­
pleted and the employer is satisfied that the employee is guilty of 
misconduct or poor performance. In other interviews, discipline has 
tentatively been decided upon and the employee is called to explain 
his actions or to present mitigating factors. In still others, the disci­
plinary decision that has been made is, to an extent, irrevocable and 
the employee is summoned only to be given and/or discuss the rea­
sons therefore. The problem of classifying interviews as either inves­
tigatory or disciplinary is also compounded by the fact that an 
interview that could be classified as disciplinary only does not neces­
sarily constitute the end of the disciplinary process. Rather, in many 
cases the disciplinary interview is only the beginning of a grievance 
process, the end result of which could be affected by what transpires 
during the alleged disciplinary or exit interview. 
In each of the above cases, an employee's request for assistance 
or representation represents the seeking of aid or protection against 
possible or actual adverse action by his employer. Thus, given the 
Weingarten holding that the section 7 right to engage in concerted 
activity for mutual aid or protection applies to an investigatory inter­
view, one which holds out only the possibility of discipline, it follows 
that the same right adheres to an interview during which discipline is 
actually imposed. 
In Mount Vernon Tanker Co. ,llS the Board so found, holding 
that a seaman had a section 7 right to refuse to attend a logging 
session absent his requested representative. I 16 Likewise, in Cert!fied 
Grocers of California, 117 a Board panel held that the section 7 right 
113. Id. 
114. Although in denying enforcement of Texaco, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with 
the Board and found the interview at issue to be investigatory, not disciplinary. Texaco 
Inc., Houston Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1969). 
115. 218 N.L.R.B. 1423 (1975), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977). 
116. Id. 
117. 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978); 
accord Alfred M. Lewis Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757 (1977), enforcement denied in part, 587 
F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978). 
23 1982) RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION 
to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection encom­
passes a right to representation at an interview held to inform an 
employee of a previously determined disciplinary decision. I IS 
There, the employer had reached a decision to discipline an em­
ployee for poor performance. During an interview with the plant 
manager, who had no authority to alter the discipline, the em­
ployee's two requests for union representation were denied. The 
plant manager told the employee that his record had been reviewed 
and that his performance had not improved. After denying the em­
ployee's request to see his records, the plant manager gave the em­
ployee a disciplinary layoff notice. The meeting ended with the 
employee asking what was expected of him and with the manager 
responding that the employee should "do [his] job.""9 The panel 
majority120 rejected the employer's argument that, under the 
Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten, a questioning or attempt to 
obtain evidence from the employee must take place for an interview 
to come within the protective ambit of section 7.'21 The majority 
noted that the Supreme Court in Weingarten had not expressly lim­
ited its holding to investigatory interviews and had, in fact, affirmed 
the Board's interpretation of the right to representation which, as de­
veloped, had never been so limited. 122 The majority also rejected the 
contention made by dissenting Member Walther that no need existed 
for a representative in a situation in which the interview was not 
held "for the purpose of eliciting facts or permitting the employee to 
explain and/or defend conduct. ..."123 Rather, the majority noted 
that the employer had engaged in "some discussion" of the em­
ployee's work and, therefore, had presented an opportunity for the 
exercise of the employee's right to seek and have assistance. 124 Fur­
ther, the majority noted that the principles enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Weingarten were equally applicable to the inter­
view involved in the case: 
The presence of [the employee's] union stewart might have re­
sulted in his apprising [the employee] of his rights, and how much 
support he could expect from his representative. Also, the union 
118. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1213. 
119. Id at 1211-12. 
120. The majority was composed of Member Fanning and former Member 
Penello. Former Member Walther dissented. 
121. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1212. 
122. Id at 1214. 
123. Id at 1216. 
124. Id at 1214. 
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representative might have elicited information that would be nec­
essary for the protection of the interests of the other employees in 
the unit, a concern expressed in the Weingarten decision. )25 
Thus, the majority applied to disciplinary interviews, where the 
right to representation had originated as a function of the bargaining 
obligation, the mutual aid or protection theory it had used in Quality 
Manlffacturing and Mobil 011, to extend a right to representation to 
investigatory interviews. )26 
The Board's holding that the section 7 right to representation 
\. 	 affirmed by the Supreme Court in Weingarten and Quality Manlffac­
turing applied to any interview to which the reasonable fear of disci­
pline attaches and not merely those containing an element of 
investigation, met with disagreement in courts of appeals, )27 particu­
larly the Ninth Circuit, which denied enforcement of Mount Vernon 
Tanker Co. v. NLRB,J28 Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB,)29 and 
NLRB v. Certified Grocers)30 on the issue. In Alfred M. Lewis, the 
court held that the right to representation arose only when a "signifi­
cant purpose of the interview is to obtain facts to support discipli­
nary action that is probable or is being seriously considered")3) and 
that, absent an investigatory element, "the protective role of the 
union representative envisioned by Weingarten is not applicable."J32 
In denying enforcement of Certtfted Grocers, the court found that the 
purpose of the meeting was not to elicit facts supporting the em­
ployer's disciplinary decision or hear the employee's side of the story 
with a view toward withholding discipline. 133 Rather, noting the 
Board's finding that the sole purpose of the meeting was to deliver a 
warning notice, the court held that no discussion or consultation 
125. Id at 1215 (footnote omitted). 
126. Id at 1212-13. The holding that the right to act in concert for mutual aid or 
protection applies to all "interviews" in which the employee reasonably fears discipline 
eliminates not only the distinction between investigatory and disciplinary interviews, but 
also eliminates any need to analyze the employee's request in terms of the section 7 right 
of employees to bargain collectively through their chosen representative: the theory used 
in Texaco. The Board has not since used the Texaco analysis to find a right to represen­
tation at any "disciplinary" interview. The Board, however, has never explicitly rejected 
the theory. 
127. See, e.g., Anchortank, Inc., v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. 
Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976). 
128. 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977). The lack of an investigatory element was an 
alternate ground upon which the court denied enforcement. Id at 574. 
129. 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978). 
130. 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978). 
131. 587 F.2d at 410. 
132. Id at 411. 
133. Id at 451. 
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took place. 134 
In Baton Rouge Water Works Co. ,135 a Board majority retreated 
from Certified Grocers and adopted the Ninth Circuit's view. In that 
case, the employer decided to fire a probationary employee. The 
employee was summoned to her supervisor's office who told her that 
she was "not working out." The employee inquired whether she was 
being fired and was told by the supervisor that it would be in the best 
interest of the company if it were her last day of employment. The 
employee then protested that the discharge was unfair and requested 
union representation. The request was denied. Subsequently, the 
office manager and assistant personnel manager entered the office 
and a discussion with employee ensued over the reasons for her ter­
mination and her alleged poor performance. 136 
In a plurality opinion, a Board majority composed of Member 
Jenkins, former Member Truesdale, and former Member Murphy, 
held that Weingarten rights did not attach to the interview. 137 Mem­
ber Jenkins and former Member Truesdale held that, to the extent 
that Certified Grocers provided a right to representation at an inter­
view in which an employee was merely informed that he was being 
disciplined, the case had been wrongly decided on its facts and was 
overruled. 138 Rather, they found that the Weingarten right did not 
apply to a meeting held "solely for the purpose of informing the em­
ployee of, and acting upon, a previously made disciplinary. deci­
sion."139 They specifically emphasized, however, that they were not 
resurrecting the distinction between investigatory and disciplinary 
interviews which was abandoned in Certified Grocers: 
We stress that we are not holding today that there is no right to the 
presence of a union representative at any "disciplinary" interview. 
Indeed, if the employer engages in any conduct beyond metely 
informing the employee of a previously made disciplinary deci­
sion, the full panoply of protections accorded the employee under 
Weingarten may be applicable. Thus, for example were the em­
ployer to inform the employee of a disciplinary action and then 
seek facts or evidence in support of that action, or to attempt to 
have the employee admit his alleged wrongdoing or to sign a 
134. Id 
135. 246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979). 
136. Id at 995. 
137. Id at 998. Former Chairman Fanning and former Member Penello each filed 
a dissent. 
138. Id at 997. 
139. Id 
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statement to that effect, or to sign statements relating to such mat­
ters as workmen's compensation, such conduct would remove the 
meeting from the narrow holding of the instant case, and the em­
ployee's right to union representation would attach. In contrast, 
the fact that the employer and employee thereafter engaged in a 
conversation at the employee's behest or instigation concerning 
the reasons for the previously determined disciplined will not, 
alone, convert the meeting to an interview at which the Wein­
garten protections apply.140 
The significance of Member Jenkins' and former Member Trues­
dale's opinion lay in their refusal to find that the discussion regard­
ing the employee's work performance and the reasons for the 
termination did not, in any way, add to the act of disciplining and 
thereby create an interview to which Weingarten rights attached. 
Thus, they viewed the interview in Baton Rouge Water to be no dif­
ferent from the type of confrontation involved in both Gypsum 141 
and Amoco Oi/ 142 where the Board found that the employers therein 
had engaged in nothing more than a ministerial act. 143 What led 
Member Jenkins and former Member Truesdale to find no signifi­
cance in the discussion was not simply the employer's failure to seek 
facts or evidence in support of the discipline or an admission from 
the employee, but also that the discussion occurred in the context of 
previously determined discipline. 144 Since the employer had reached 
a "final, binding decision"145 to discharge the employee, the subse­
quent discussion was viewed as being incapable of affecting the out­
come and any attempt at concerted activity as being meaningless. 146 
They specifically rejected the contention that the presence of the rep­
resentative would address any of the concerns expressed m 
Weingarten. 
Contrary to the contention of the majority in Certified Grocers, 
such a conversation or discussion between the employer and em­
ployee does not require the presence of a union representative to 
inform the employee of his rights and the support the employee 
140. Id (footnote omitted). 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
142. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75. 
143. The same could be argued regarding the Ninth Circuit's denial of enforce­
ment of the Board's decisions in Mount Vernon, A!fred M Lewis, and Cert(/ied Grocers. 
The court viewed such cases as representing no more than the act of imposing discipline, 
notwithstanding any discussion that may have occurred. 
144. 246 N.L.R.B. at 997. 
145. Id 
146. Id 
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might expect from the union, or to elicit information necessary for 
the protection of the interests of the other employees in the unit. 
Once a disciplinary decision has been made by the employer, the 
proper forum for the discussion and evaluation of that discipli­
nary action shifts to the grievance procedure. Unlike an interview 
at which no formal action is taken by the employer, the invocation 
of discipline by the employer automatically subjects that decision 
to the grievance procedure, during which all the events surround­
ing the disciplinary action can be examined and evaluated by the 
union, and a decision made by the union as to the best course of 
action to be taken in light of the interests of all of the employees in 
the unit. 147 
In a separate concurring opinion, former Member Murphy ex­
pressed no significant disagreement. Stating her opinion that Wein­
garten required that the Board maintain a real distinction between 
investigatory interviews and disciplinary actions, 148 she found that 
the Weingarten right attached to any interview, whether it was called 
investigatory or disciplinary, in which information is sought from 
the employee. 149 Likewise, she found that a conference called to ap­
prise an employee of adverse action or the reasons therefore did not 
amount to an investigatory interview, even if an "employee's protes­
tations result in an extended confrontation with representatives of 
management and discussion is consequently expanded to include 
specific examples of employee misfeasance."IS0 
I dissented from the majority decision in Baton Rouge Water. 151 
As I viewed the matter, the work performance discussion therein 
converted an otherwise ministerial act into an interview to which 
section 7 rights attached; a result of the fact that the discussion 
presented the opportunity for concerted activity designed to counter 
the disciplinary action. In this regard, the fact that the employee 
instigated the discussion should be of no relevance. 1S2 The meeting 
147. Id at 997 n.6. 
148. Id at 998 (Member Murphy, concurring). 
149. Id 
150. Id 
151. Id at 999-1000 (former Chairman Fanning, dissenting). In a separate dissent, 
former Member Penello outlined the development of the Weingarten right, pointing out 
that Weingarten represented an extension of the right to representation from "discipli­
nary" interviews to "investigatory" interviews. Id at 1000 (former Member Penello, dis­
senting). Former Member Penello thus argued that the effect of the majority's decision 
was to remove from employees a section 7 right that existed before the Weingarten deci­
sion and upon which the Weingarten right was based. Id 
152. Nor did the majority actually consider the employee's instigation of the dis­
cussion to be relevant. In Texaco, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1979), a companion case to 
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had not been concluded and the employer, who could have cut off 
the employee's protestations and inquiries, chose not to do SO.153 
The Baton Rouge Water decision is significant because of the 
majority's questionable reliance on the facts that the employer had 
decided to impose discipline before the meeting and that the plant 
manager who conducted the meeting had no authority to alter the 
discipline. For although the exchange between the employee and 
her superiors might not have changed the particular outcome of the 
meeting, the exchange still may have affected both the employer's 
decision to adhere subsequently to the announced disciplinary deci­
sion and its actions in regard to that decision. As the majority recog­
nized, the disciplinary interview was not the end of the disciplinary 
process. 154 Rather, it was only the beginning of a grievance proce­
dure during which the employer would be called on to adhere to its 
decision and thus, the discipline imposed at the meeting was not, as 
the majority characterized it, "final and binding."155 Since the work 
performance discussion potentially could affect the employer's re­
solve to adhere to the discipline, the statutory concerns underlying 
the Weingarten right were no less applicable. Similarly, any assist­
ance rendered to the employee in the discussion would be consistent 
with the role of representative as envisioned by the Court in Wein­
garten. Could not the representative have presented extenuating 
factors or elicited facts favorable to the employee who may have 
been too fearful or inarticulate to do so herself? Could not the repre­
sentative have assisted the employee in voicing her contention that 
her discharge was unfair or in countering the employer's contentions 
as to her alleged faulty performance and its opinion that she was not 
Baton Rouge Water, the majority relied on Baton Rouge Water and found that no section 
7 right attached to meetings called to inform employees of previously determined disci­
plinary decisions and to afford the employees an opportunity to explain or defend them­
selves. Id. at 1022. The majority found it critical that the opportunity provided the 
employees could not have changed the result of the meeting and that, by the offer, the 
employer was not attempting to obtain information in support of any decision. In Tex­
aco, Inc., the Baton Rouge Water majority made it clear that they were requiring the 
existence of an investigatory element before Weingarten rights attached to any employer­
employee confrontation. Id. at 1021. 
153. Compare the concurring opinion of former Chairman Fanning and former 
Member Penello in Texaco Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633 (1980), enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th 
Cir. 1981) and Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 612, 614 n.4 (1980), enforcement 
denied, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1981), with 246 N.L.R.B. at 1000 (former Chairman Fan­
ning, dissenting). 
154. 246 N.L.R.B. at 997 n.6. 
155. Id. at 997. 
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working out? Could not such assistance have caused the employer to 
reconsider and question its initial decision? 
Even in the absence of a formal grievance procedure following 
discipline, situations arise in which an employer is called upon to 
reconsider or reaffirm an announced disciplinary action and the rea­
sons therefore. A discussion taking place during the imposition of 
discipline may affect an employer's recommendation to other em­
ployers, its own consideration of the employee for reemployment, or 
its position with regard to an unemployment compensation claim. In 
cases where the discipline is less than discharge, the discussion may 
have bearing on how the employer views the employee's work and 
disciplinary history or treats similar transgressions. 
An employer's actions with regard to any of its disciplinary de­
cisions raises real, job related concerns indistinguishable from and of 
no less importance than those raised by the prospect of the discipline 
itself. Concerted activity aimed at addressing and alleviating those 
concerns is no less for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. ls6 It 
was the Baton Rouge Water majority's refusal to give weight to such 
post-decision concerns which led it therein to unduly restrict the 
scope of section 7 as it relates to confrontations between employers 
and employees which concern the imposition of discipline. ls7 
The Baton Rouge Water decision also leaves open the issue of 
whether a right to at least union representation would attach to the 
type of meeting involved therein as a function of the section 7 right 
of employees to bargain through representatives of their own choos­
ing, as well as the issue of whether a union would have section 
8(a)(5) rights to be present. In concluding that Weingarten rights did 
not apply to the factual situation present, the majority concluded 
only that section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mutual 
aid or protection did not require that the employer grant the em­
ployee's request for union representation. As discussed previously, 
the Board had, under the pre-Weingarten, Texaco line of cases, 
found that a right to representation at disciplinary interviews existed 
as the function of a union's status as exclusive bargaining representa­
tive, and the concomitant section 7 right of employees to be repre­
sented thereby.ls8 Given the work performance discussion which 
156. The value of representation is diminished if relegated to the grievance proce­
dure. As the Court noted in Weingarten, "[t]he employer may then be more concerned 
with justifying his actions than re-examining them." 420 U.S. at 264. 
157. At least one federal court of appeals has cited Baton Rouge Water with ap­
proval. See Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1167 (5th Cir. 1980). 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 28-3\. 
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took place in Baton Rouge Water, it would appear that the meeting 
conducted therein, in terms of both its extent and purpose, was no 
different than the meeting held in the original Texaco decision 
where the Board stated: 
Thus it is clear that on November 17 the Company sought to deal 
directly with [the employee] concerning matters affecting his terms 
and conditions of employment. Yet as noted, the employees in the 
unit had selected the Union to deal with the [company] on such 
matters and there is evidence that either [the employee]-assum­
ing he could have done so-<>r the Union had waived to any ex­
tent the right to representation or had agreed to channelize 
disputes concerning such right into the procedures of the contract 
grievance provisions. Consequently,. . . the [company's] refusal 
to respect [the employee's] request that the bargaining representa­
tive be permitted to represent him at the meeting interfered with 
and restrained him in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by Sec­
tion 7 of the Act. 159 
Whether the present Board would be disposed to apply a right 
to union representation to a Baton Rouge Water-type meeting, one 
which would inure both to the union and the employee as a function 
of the bargaining obligations must, of course, await a case which 
properly presents the issue. By means of this discussion, I seek only 
to raise the issue apd do not imply how I, as a Board member, would 
decide it. Any decision to again apply the rationale of Texaco to 
meetings or interviews held for the purpose of imposing discipline 
would require that the Board, in considering the competing interests 
of the employer, employee, and the union, take into account the 
present existence of Weingarten right as developed by the Board. 160 
B. The Request 
As developed by the Board, the Weingarten right is the section 7 
right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection 
159. 168 N.L.R.B. at 362. 
160. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court majority noted the existence of the Texaco 
line of cases, but expressed neither agreement nor disagreement with the Texaco ration­
ale. 420 U.S. at 264. Dissenting Justices Powell and Stewart, however, did express 
doubts as to the correctness of the Texaco rationale. See id. at 271 n.3. In this regard, 
compare the Fifth Circuit's decision denying enforcement of Texaco, 408 F.2d at 145 
(employee had no right to union representation at an investigatory interview simply be­
cause employer had previously committed itself to disciplining the employees) witlt its 
discussion of the Baton Rouge Water and Texaco line of cases in Anchortank, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980) (no right to representation at an interview 
condu,cted solely to inform employee of predetermined disciplinary decision). 
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during certain interviews or meetings at which the reasonable fear of 
discipline obtains. Since it is an employee right, it must be invoked 
by request. 161 Absent such request, nothing in the Act requires an 
employer to allow a representative at such meetings. It is for the 
employees, not the employer, to determine whether concerted activ­
ity is undertaken in response to any employer action. 
The nature of the Weingarten right requires that it be invoked 
only by the employee who reasonably fears discipline. The right to 
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid protection does not re­
quire an employer to permit the representation of an unwilling em­
ployee. However, it is not necessary that the employee himself make 
the request to the employer. All that should be required is that the 
request be authorized by the employee or that, in the face of a re­
quest, the employee indicate his willingness to be represented and 
thereby adopt the request. 162 
That one's right to representation or assistance may not be in­
voked by others does not necessarily mean that employee attempts to 
represent other employees necessarily fall outside the protective am­
bit of section 7. A request to represent or assist an employee is no 
less an attempt to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or pro­
tection than is a request to be represented. Thus, in Quality Manu­
facturing the Board found that two union stewards who sought to 
represent an employee at an investigatory interview were engaged in 
concerted activity protected by section 7 and could not be disciplined 
for their attempts. 163 
A request, to be valid, must be made or communicated to the 
management official who is conducting the interview or meeting or is 
161. 420 U.s. at 257. See also Materials Research Co., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 
L.R.R.M. 1401, 1403 n.1O (1982); Kohl's Food Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 75 (1980); General 
Motors Assembly Div., 245 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1979); Inland Container Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 
1298 (1979); Greyhound Lines Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 849 (1978). 
162. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. 1411, 
1412 n.5 (1982). Cf. Appalachian Power Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 931 (1980) (union representa­
tive cannot invoke Weingarten rights on behalf of employee). 
163. 195 N.L.R.B. at 199. 
In Quality Mfg., the stewards insisted upon representing an employee who at the 
same time, insisted on being represented. Id at 197-98. Therefore, the stewards and the 
employee were engaged in concerted activity and thus should be protected by section 7. 
Section 7 should also provide some limited protection to attempts to represent an unwill­
ing employee. At least until the time that the offer of assistance is rejected by the em­
ployee, the union employee who seeks to provide the assistance is attempting to engage 
in concerted activity and his right to do so should not depend on his lack of success. 
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capable of granting the request. l64 However, an employee who 
makes a valid request on the plant floor need not repeat it at the 
office. 165 
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 166 the Board determined 
what constitutes a valid request for representation. There, four em­
ployees were called to investigatory interviews. During their inter­
views, one employee asked whether union representation was 
needed and another stated that he would like to have "someone 
there to explain ... what was happening."167 During a group dis­
cussion of the incident being investigated, one of the employees 
again asked about calling in the union. 168 A Board majorityl69 re­
versed the administrative law judge's finding that none of the em­
ployees had made a clear, unequivocal request for representation, 
finding instead that the request for someone was all that Weingarten 
required to invoke the right to representation. 170 The majority also 
found that the other statements, though less forthright, constituted 
valid requests for representation in that they were "sufficient to put 
the Employer on notice as to the employees' desires."171 
Once a valid request for representation has been made, an em­
ployer must grant the request, exercise its legitimate prerogative to 
discontinue the attempted interview,172 or offer the employee the 
choice of attending the interview unassisted or having no interview 
at all. 173 Unless the employee voluntarily agrees to remain after hav­
ing been offered the choice, or is otherwise aware of it, the employer 
164. See Appalachian Power Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 931, 934 (1980); Lennox Indus., 
Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 607, 609 (1979). 
165. Roadway Express, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1127, 1128 (1979); Lennox Indus., Inc., 
244 N.L.R.B. 607, 608 (1979). 
166. 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977). 
167. Id 
168. Id at 1225 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting). 
169. Former Chairman Murphy, Member Fanning and Member Jenkins com­
posed the majority. Former Members Penello and Walther dissented. 
170. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1223. 
171. Id A request for a "witness" is sufficient. Good Samaritan Nursing Home, 
Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 207 (1980). Bu/ see Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 249 N.L.R.B. I 
(1980). In Levings/on, an employee's statements concerning a "lawyer" were interpreted 
as going toward legal representation in court and not toward representation of any type 
at the interview. Id at I n.2. Of course, representation by a private lawyer is not 
equivalent to union representation as the lawyer cannot claim the status of serving the 
interests of the entire bargaining unit. See Sentry Investigation Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 926, 
936 n.20 (1980). 
172. 420 U.S. at 258. 
173. Id 
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may not proceed without violating section 8(a)(I),l14 
While a request need be only sufficient to put the employer on 
notice of the employee's desire for representation, the above-de­
scribed options available to an employer faced with a request for 
representation presume the ability to comply with the request. How­
ever, depending upon their phrasing, not all requests for representa­
tion can, in fact, be complied with. For example, a specific 
individual requested as the representative may not be available. In 
such circumstances, the Board has found that the employer is not 
necessarily limited to the option of forgoing the interview or offering 
the employee the choice of an interview without assistance or no in­
terview at all. 175 Rather, in cases involving the unavailability of a 
union representative in general or a particular person sought as a 
representative, the Board has balanced the employee's interest in ob­
taining representation and the employer's interest in conducting the 
interview without interference or delay. 
In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. ofLos Angeles,176 an employee called 
to an investigatory interview requested the presence of his union 
steward who, the employee knew, was on vacation. 177 The adminis­
trative law judge found that, by the request, the employee was at­
tempting to postpone the interviewl78 and concluded that, under 
Weingarten, the employer had no obligation to do so. A Board ma­
jorityl79 adopted the administrative law judge's decision stating: 
[T]here is nothing the Supreme Court's opinion in Weingarten 
which indicates that an employer must postpone interviews with 
its employees because a particular union representative, here the 
shop steward, is unavailable either for personal or other reasons 
for which the employer is not responsible, where another repre­
sentative is available whose presence could have been requested 
by the employee in the absent representative's place. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court was careful to point out that the exercise by em­
ployees of the right to representation at an interview may not in­
174. Good Samaritan Nursing Home, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 207, 209 (1980); United 
States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 141 (1979). 
175. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1276, 1276 (1977). 
176. 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977). 
177. Id 
178. Id at 1279. The fact that the employee was attempting to postpone the inter­
view would serve as an independent basis for denying the request for representation as 
the employee was not actually seeking representation. Obviously, Weingarten rights 
should not be used as a shield against discipline through an insistence on representation 
by a specific unavailable person. 
179. The majority was composed of former Chairman Murphy and former Mem­
bers Penello and Walther. 
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terfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. Certainly the right 
to hold interviews of this type without delay is a legitimate em­
ployer prerogative. The fact that "it would not have been a disas­
ter" to postpone the meeting to await [the steward's] return is 
therefore immaterial. I80 
The majority decision in Coca-Cola represents more than a 
mere balancing of the employer's interest in conducting the inter­
view without delay or interference and the employee's interest in be­
ing represented. In finding that the employer was privileged to 
conduct the interview, the majority relied heavily on the fact that, 
given the unavailability of the particular steward, the employee did 
not request or propose an alternative: 
In fact, Respondent never denied [the employee's] request; it was 
simply unable to comply therewith. When [the employee] was in­
formed of this fact, he did not, as he could have, request alterna­
tive representation. We see nothing in Weingarten which implies 
that it is the employer's obligation to suggest and/or secure alter­
native representation where the representative originally re­
quested by the employee is unavailable. 181 
Member Jenkins and I dissented. First, we found the fact that 
the interview was postponed until the steward returned "would not 
have been a disaster," according to the employer, dictated that the 
proper balance between the employer's interests and the employee's 
be struck in favor of granting the employee's request. 182 This was 
especially true since the result was that the employee was inter­
viewed without the benefit of any representation at all. 183 In this 
regard, we took issue with the majority's placing the burden of pro­
posing or securing an alternative to the requested, unavailable stew­
ard on the employee and not the employer. l84 Unlike the majority, 
we viewed the employee's request for the steward as a request for 
help which, although phrased in terms of the assistance of a particu­
lar union agent, was not necessarily limited thereto. As such, the 
request was, in fact, capable of being complied with by the employer 
and absent an attempt to comply, was not the employee's obligation 
to sort the matter out: 
180. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1276 (footnote omitted). 
181. Id. (footnote omitted). 
182. Id. at 1277 (Members Jenkins & Fanning, dissenting). 
183. Id. at 1276. The issue, therefore, was whether the employee was to be ac­
corded representation, not whether the employee would have his choice of 
representative. 
184. Id. at 1277 (Members Jenkins & Fanning, dissenting). 
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[The employee] did not request any alternative union representa­
tion and this factor appears to have influenced the Administrative 
Law Judge considerably; he apparently concluded that because 
there was a business agent available [the employee] should have 
asked for and been content with him. We do not agree. 
To put the burden of all this on the employee, as our col­
leagues do, is completely to negate the purpose of Weingarten. It 
is because employees are not skilled in the niceties of procedure 
that they need help. Weingarten holds that the employee is enti­
tled to such help ifhe asks for it. [The employee] asked. The help 
was denied, and Respondent proceeded to do what Weingarten 
says it cannot do-to conduct the interview with the unassisted 
employee who had not been informed of his rights. The case is as 
simple as that and the violation plain.18s 
In Coca-Cola, the alternate union representative was not at the 
site and this fact might serve to explain why the employer was found 
to have no burden to suggest or supply such representative in place 
ofthe absent steward. In a subsequent case, however, another Board 
majority indicated that, even given the presence of a number of 
union agents on the scene, an employer was under no obligation to 
suggest alternatives when the specific representative requested by the 
employee was absent at the time of the interview. In Roadway Ex­
press, Inc. ,186 the union had designated a number of alternate com­
mitteemen to represent employees during the absence of the regular· 
committeeman. An employee called to an interview concerning an 
acrimonious exchange with his supervisor stated that he would not 
attend because his committeeman had gone home ill. 187 There was 
no evidence that, at the time of his refusal, the employee was aware 
of the union's designation of alternate committeemen. 
Relying on Coca-Cola, the majority reversed the administrative 
law judge's finding that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) by 
summarily suspending the employee for refusing to attend the inter­
view. 188 In so concluding, the majority found that the employee had, 
in fact, been apprised of the existence of an alternate committeeman, 
albeit as the employee was leaving the plant, but had rejected such 
an option. 189 However, the majority also went on to state that it 
185. Id 
186. 246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979). Former Members Penello, Murphy and Truesdale 
composed the majority. Member Jenkins and Chairman Fanning dissented. 
187. Id at 1135. 
188. Id at 1130. 
189. Id This finding was, at best, dubious in light of the surrounding circum­
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would have reached the same result even if the employees had not 
been so informed: 
Even accepting the premisc that [the employee] was not made 
aware [of the alternate committeeman's status as such] when he 
initially refused representation by him, we nevertheless adhere to 
our finding that no violation occurred as we believe that the bur­
den of informing unit members of the designation of union offi­
cials is one more appropriately borne by the bargaining agent. 
Here the Union appointed the three alJernate committeemen spe­
cifically so that no night-shift employee would be without repre­
sentation if the need arose. We would, therefore, not hold 
Respondent accountable for the Union's failure to shoulder its ap­
propriate obligation in this situation. 19o 
Member Jenkins and I dissented as we had in Coca-Cola, ques­
tioning as well as the majority's reliance on the union's actions: 
Finally, we disagree with the majority's assertion that the Union's 
failure to announce [the alternate committeeman's] appointment 
may operate to [the employee's] detriment. In appointing the 
committeemen, the Union was attempting to afford night-shift 
employees additional representation. The Union had no such ob­
ligation to do so, and it is clear that, in the absence of any repre­
sentative at the plant at the time of the interview, an employer 
must respect the employee's request for assistance, even if it means 
delaying the interview. Consequently, the majority has turned the 
Union's voluntary attempt to assist the employees into a pitfall, 
causing them to be deprived of protections formerly available. 191 
To the extent that Coca-Cola and Roadway Express relieve an 
employer of the obligation to afford any representation to an em­
ployee who requests, by name, representation by an individual who 
happens to be unavailable, these decisions distort the Weingarten 
right and seriously limit the exercise thereof. The right is distorted 
stances. Significantly, the employee allegedly was not apprised of the presence of the 
alternate committeeman until after the employee had been sent home and was in the 
process of leaving the plant. Id How the employee's right to insist upon representation 
when called to the interview could be dependent on subsequent developments was an 
issue not addressed by the majority. 
190. Id 
191. Id at 1133 (footnote omitted). An employer's right not to delay an interview 
due to the absence of a specifically requested representative, when the employer provides 
or proposes an alternative, is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 193­
203. In Roadway Express, however, the requested representative was due to arrive within 
one half hour of the incident. As a result of the employer's failure to obtain or propose 
an alternate, the employee was faced with the prospect of being interviewed without any 
representation. 246 N.L.R.B. at 1137. 
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because a request for representation framed in terms of the represen­
tation or assistance of a particular person is no less a request for 
representation than one framed in general terms. Nothing inherent 
in such a request indicates that the employee desires representation 
by the requested individual to the exclusion of all others. Absent 
evidence that the employee in fact desires only representation by the 
person he names, an employer should not be allowed to seize upon 
the absence or unavailability of the requested individual to deny the 
request and stand silent, hoping that the employee will fail to ask for 
an alternative. IfSouthwestern Bell is of any value as precedent, that 
option is not available to an employer faced with an employee's re­
quest for a particular representative and should not arise merely be­
cause the employee happens to know and mention the name of his 
union steward. Further, no legitimate employer interest exists in 
support of such an option. 
Apart from the issue of where the burden of proposing or secur­
ing alternative representation lies, Coca-Cola and Roadway Express 
stand for the proposition that, given the availability of alternative 
representation, the employee is not guaranteed his choice of repre­
sentative. Rather, the Board will balance the employee's desires 
against the employer's interest in proceeding without delay and in­
terference. For example, in Crown Zellerbach, Inc. ,192 the Board 
adopted an administrative law judge's finding that the employer did 
not violate the Weingarten right when it failed to grant an em­
ployee's request for a union representative and instead provided the 
assistance of a fellow employee who was the most visible and active 
union adherent and who had been acting as the de facto spokesman 
for the employees. 193 There, the union had been recently certified 
and had not yet designated any stewards at the employer's plant. 
Further, the nearest union official was sixty miles away.194 Under 
such circumstances, the administrative law judge found that the em­
ployer had done all it reasonably could be expected to do. He noted 
that it was the employer who offered the assistance of the union ac­
tivist and thereby was attempting to comply with the request for rep­
resentation rather than overpower the lone employee. He further 
noted that the employee had accepted the employer's offer of alter­
native representation and that the union activist had, in fact, pro­
192. 239 N.L.R.B. 1124 (1978). The fact that the employer had offered, and the 
employee had accepted, the alternate representation, id. at 1127, made the case readily 
distinguishable from Coca-Cola, upon which the administrative law judge had relied. 
193. Id. at 1124. 
194. Id. at 1126. 
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vided the assistance and representation contemplated by the 
Supreme Court in Weingarten .195 
The Board engaged in similar balancing in Pac!fic Gas & Electric 
Co. 196 There, in response to a request for union representation by a 
union steward subjected to an investigatory interview, the employer 
provided the other union steward present at the site. However, the 
employee objected to representation by that particular steward since 
the steward was friendly with the management official conducting 
the interview, was being considered for a management position at 
the time of the interview, and had expressed a reluctance to get in­
volved in the matter. The employee instead insisted upon being rep­
resented by a fellow steward located at a site five miles away.197 A 
Board panel,198 with Member Jenkins dissenting, adopted the ad­
ministrative law judge's decision that the employer was under no ob­
ligation to postpone the interview in order to obtain the requested 
off-site steward stating: 
The Supreme Court in Weingarten neither stated nor suggested 
that an employee's interests can only be safeguarded by the pres­
ence of a spec!fic representative sought by the employee. To the 
contrary, the focus of the decision is on the employee's right to the 
presence of a union representative designated by the union to rep­
resent all employees. 199 
The majority rejected the contention that the proximity of the re­
quested steward made both stewards equally available. Further, in 
discounting the importance of the employee's need to be represented 
by a steward in whom he had confidence, the majority argued that 
granting the employee's request for the off-site steward would, in ef­
fect, negate the union's choice of its agent: 
Our interpretation of Weingarten must be tempered by a sense of 
industrial reality. We do not advance the effectuation of em­
ployee rights, or contribute to the stability of industrial relations, 
if we complicate the already complex scheme of Weingarten by 
introducing the notion that an employee may request this union 
representative instead of that one, perhaps from a far comer of the 
plant, and perhaps, in certain instances, contrary to the union's 
wishes. In the instant case, a duly designated union representative 
was ready, willing, able and present. We would inquire no 
195. Id. at 1127. See also Southwestern Bell, 251 N.L.R.B. at 625 n.7. 
196. 253 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1981). 
197. Id. 
198. Former Members Penello and Truesdale composed the majority. 
199. 253 N.L.R.B. at 1143 (emphasis in original). 
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further. 2OO 
Given the proximity of the requested steward and the nature of 
the employee's objections to the proffered steward, there is consider­
able appeal to dissenting Member Jenkins' position that the balance, 
between the employer's legitimate prerogative of conducting its in­
vestigation and the employee's interest in obtaining the representa­
tion he sought, should have been struck in favor of the employee. 
Member Jenkins found that the majority neither required nor relied 
upon any proffered justification as to why the employer could not 
have tolerated a delay which, in the view of the majority, would not 
have exceeded forty minutes. 
While avoidance of delay and interference in investigatory or 
disciplinary procedures is certainly a legitimate employer preroga­
tive, a proper analysis requires that it be balanced against the coun­
tervailing statutory interest in favor of limiting an employer's 
discretion to control with whom an employee may engage in con­
certed activity for mutual aid or protection.201 Assuming the availa­
bility of the requested representative, the employee's choice should 
control. Therefore, in situations where an employee presents legiti­
mate reasons for objecting to representation by the representative 
provided by the employer, it is only reasonable to require that the 
employer justify its denial of the employee's choice in terms of a 
burden on its processes which is actual, rather than presumed and 
which outweighs the employee's statutory interests. The Board's de­
cision in Pac!fic Gas & Electric, however, requires no such justifica­
tion on the part of the employer where an alternative, but undesired, 
representative is present and suggests that any delay is an impermis­
sible interference with a legitimate employer prerogative.202 Thus, to 
the extent the Board has balanced the competing interests of the em­
200. Id at 1144. 
201. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Nursing Home, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 207 (1980). 
There, the employer unlawfully refused an employee's request for a witness telling the 
employee that inasmuch as a supervisor was present to witness the meeting, the employee 
did not need a witness. Id at 208. See also Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 932, 934 
(1980) (Board found that the employer could not deny an employee's request to be repre­
sented by a fellow employee as opposed to the employee's union steward), enforced as 
mod(fted, 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982). 
202. See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 375, 390 
(1981), enforced mem., 673 F.2d 1314 (4th Cir. 1982) (Board found that an employer 
acted lawfully when it provided as a representative an employee different than the one 
requested, without making any attempt to determine the location or availability of the 
requested employee). Cf. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977) and 
Roadway Express, 246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979) (no inquiry was made as to the employer's 
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ployer and the employee, the balance has been struck heavily in 
favor of the employer. 
C. 	 The Representative 
The Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten represents an in­
terpretation of the scope of the section 7 right of employees to en­
gage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection; specifically, 
that the section 7 right encompassed a right to union representation. 
However, given the nature of the right affirmed therein, the Wein­
garten decision left open a number of issues as to the type of repre­
sentative guaranteed by section 7. Does the right to engage in 
concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, a right not generally 
dependent on representative status, also inure to unrepresented, as 
well as represented employees? Assuming that there is a request for 
union representation, what status must the union enjoy before a right 
to representation by its agents will be guaranteed? In a series of 
post-Weingarten decisions, the Board has answered both of these 
questions. 
1. 	 The Representative Status of the Employee and/or 
Representative 
In their dissenting opinion in Weingarten, Justices Powell and 
Stewart noted that the majority's holding that the section 7 right to 
engage in concerted activity guaranteed the right to union represen­
tation had broader implications: 
While the Court speaks only of the right to insist on the pres­
ence of a union representative, it must be assumed that the § 7 
right today recognized, affording employees the right to act "in 
concert" in employer interviews, also exists in the absence of a 
recognized union.203 
reasons for refusing to postpone the interviews and for refusing to provide the requested 
representative). 
The Board's discussion in Coca-Cola regarding the employee's failure to request an 
alternate representative who was also not at the site indicates that an employer may have 
to tolerate some delay when no other union representative is readily available. See Con­
solidated Freightways Corp., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,246, 
at 25,789 (Oct. 22, 1982). 
While Crown Zellerbach and Illinois Bell indicate that a fellow employee may, 
under certain circumstances, satisfy an employee's request for union representation, the 
Board has not yet been faced with a case where a fellow employee was provided by the 
employer despite an employee's insistence on union representation. 
203. 420 U.S. at 270 n.l (Stewart, J., dissenting). Cj NLRB v. Washington Alumi­
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In Glomac Plastics,204 the Board expressed agreement with the 
dissenting justices' logical assumption, stating: 
We conclude that Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees 
and are in no wise dependent on union representation for their 
implementation. The Court's Weingarten and Quality decisions 
are clearly grounded on Section 7 of the Act which guarantees 
employees rights and guarantees, in particular, the right of em­
ployees "to engage in . . . concerted activities for. . . other mu­
tual aid or protection." We do not believe the Court's decisions 
command us to interpret Section 7 in a manner which is clearly 
restrictive of its broad scope or does violence to its purposes. 
. . . [T]he Court's primary concern was with the right of em­
ployees to have some measure of protection against unjust em­
ployer practices, particularly those that threaten job security. 
These employee concerns obtain whether or not the employees are 
represented by a union.205 
The Board has adhered to its interpretation that the section 7 
right to representation affirmed in Weingarten applies to represented 
and unrepresented employees alike. Thus, in Anchortank, Inc. ,206 
the Board noted that, not only were the statutory concerns underly­
ing the Weingarten right unaffected by the absence of a collective 
bargaining representative, but that the role of the representative as 
envisioned by the Weingarten Court was likewise unaffected: 
Indeed, the union representative's role is limited to assisting the 
employee and possibly attempting to clarify the facts or suggest 
other employees who may have knowledge of them. Thus, the 
union representative is not permitted to use the powers conferred 
upon the union by its designation as collective-bargaining agent, 
and, in essence, may do no more during the course of the inter­
view than could a fellow employee.207 
num Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (walkout by unrepresented employees amounted to concerted 
activity). 
204. 234 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1978), enforced, 600 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1979). 
205. 234 N.L.R.B. at 13l1. 
206. 239 N.L.R.B. 430 (1978), enforced as mod!fied, 618 F.2d 1I53 (5th Cir. 1980). 
207. Id at 430-31. As the Court noted in Weingarten: 
[T)he employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may 
be permitted to attend the investigatory interview. The Board said in Mobil 
[Oil), we are not giving the Union any particular rights with respect to predis­
ciplinary discussions which it otherwise was not able to secure during collec­
. tive-bargaining negotiations. 
420 U.S. at 259 (citation omitted). 
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In Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 208 the Board relied on Glomac 
and Anchortank and found that, given the section 7 right of employ­
ees to act in concert, an employer could not deny an employee's re­
quest to be represented by a fellow employee and require that the 
employee be represented by a union agent.209 
While at least two courts of appeals210 have indicated their 
agreement that Weingarten rights inure to unrepresented employees, 
the Board's holding in this regard has been recently criticized from 
within. In Materials Research Corp. ,211 the two most recent appoint­
ments to the Board, Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter, 
separately dissented from the Board's reversal of an administrative 
law judge's conclusion, notwithstanding Glomac and Anchortank, 
that Weingarten rights did not apply to unrepresented employees.212 
In their dissents, Chairman Van de Water and, particularly, 
Member Hunter, focused on the Supreme Court's finding that a re­
quest for union representation amounted to concerted activity for 
mutual aid or protection since the union representative not only 
safeguarded the interests of the particular employee but also the in­
terests of the entire bargaining unit. They argued that a fellow em­
ployee could not claim such status.213 Member Hunter also focused 
on the Court's discussion of the protection provided by a "knowl­
edgeable union representative" who "could assist the employer by 
eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer production time by 
208. 251 N.L.R.B. 932 (1980), enforced as modified, 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982). 
209. Id at 933-34. The Board noted that concerted activity for mutual aid or pro­
tection, when engaged in by represented employees, cannot be in derogation of their 
bargaining agent's status. Id at 933. See also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addi­
tion Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). The Board found however, that nothing in the 
operative collective bargaining agreement required the presence of a union representa­
tive at investigatory interviews; that the employer and union had no oral understanding 
as to the procedure for representation at such; and that the employee's request for a 
fellow employee occurred at a time when no union agent was present at the site. 251 
N.L.R.B. at 933. Accord Los Angeles Water Treatment, 263 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 1982-83 
NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,\09, at 25,386 (Aug. 9, 1982). 
2\0. See Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Co­
lumbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
211. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. 1401 (1982). Members lenkins, Zim­
merman, and Fanning composed the majority. 
212. Id, 1 \0 L.R.R.M. at 1406 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting); Id, 1\0 
L.R.R.M. at 1410 (Member Hunter, dissenting). As Glomac, Anchortank, and Illinois 
Bell all involved requests for representation made by represented employees, their dis­
cussion in the cases regarding the rights of unrepresented employees was dicta. Materials 
Research, on the other hand, was the first case which squarely presented the issue. Id, 
1\0 L.R.R.M. at 1401-02. 
213. Id, 1\0 L.R.R.M. 1409 n.39 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting); Id, 1\0 
L.R.R.M. at 1411 (Member Hunter, dissenting). 
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getting to the bottom of the incident."214 Thus, the dissenters rea­
soned that the right to representation found in Weingarten was 
grounded in the Supreme Court's view of obligations and functions 
of a collective bargaining representative.21S 
The majority answered both contentions. First it noted that the 
Weingarten Court's discussion of the status and function of a union 
representative constituted an explanation of why a request for union 
representation constituted concerted activity for mutual aid or pro­
tection and did not determine that only a request for such represen­
tation fell within the literal wording of section 7. 
An employee's request for the assistance of his union representa­
tive constitutes concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, 
whether or not the union representative is a fellow employee. In a 
represented unit, the union is the embodiment of the concerted 
activity of all unit employees and, as the Court noted, the repre­
sentative serves a common interest as well as that of the individual 
employee. However, a request for the assistance of a fellow em­
ployee is also concerted activity-in its most basic and obvious 
form-since employees are seeking to act together. It is likewise 
activity for mutual aid or protection: by such, all employees can 
214. Id, liD L.R.R.M. at 1411 (Member Hunter, dissenting). See NLRB v. J. 
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 263. 
215. In support of this contention, Chairman Ven de Water argued that the right 
involved in Weingarten was the right "to be free from employer interference which de­
prives employees of the representation of their duly chosen agent." 262 N.L.R.B. No. 
122, liD L.R.R.M. at 1408 n.36 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting) (emphasis added). 
In so characterizing the right, Chairman Van de Water relied heavily on the pre-Wein­
garten, Texaco line of cases in which the Board had found a right to union representa­
tion at disciplinary interviews as a function of the collective bargaining obligation. 
While the Chairman was correct in his view of the holding of Texaco, he mischaracter­
ized the nature of the Board's holding in Mobil Oil and Quality Mfg., wherein the Board 
extended to investigatory interviews the right to a union representative on the basis of a 
wholly different section 7 right-the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid 
or protection-a right which does not require a collective bargaining relationship for its 
exercise. See 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052; 195 N.L.R.B. at 198. 
Chairman Van de Water's view of a Weingarten "representative" as a collective bar­
gaining representative led him to conclude that a request for representation by a fellow 
employee might constitute a seeking of mutual aid or protection under section 7 of the 
Act. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, liD L.R.R.M. at 1410. He argued nonetheless, however, that 
section 7 did not require the employer to grant such a request inasmuch as doing so 
would require an employer to "recognize" and "deal with" a "representative" not chosen 
by a majority of unit employees. Id Central to this position was the Chairman's view 
that "Congress has declared that the means by which employees are to redress [the im­
balance ofeconomic power existing between employer and employee] is utilization of the 
Act's processes for majority selection of an exclusive collective-bargaining representa­
tive." Id, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1408 n.37. That view, however, is of doubtful validity. See 
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U:S. 9, 14-18 (1962). 
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be assured that they can too can avail themselves of the assistance 
of a Coworker in like circumstances, "as nobody doubts."216 
Second, the majority reiterated what it had stated in G/omac 
and Anchortank: A Weingarten representative was not present as a 
collective bargaining representative and, therefore, a fellow em­
ployee need not be a union representative to render assistance and 
protection contemplated by the Court: 
Furthermore, the type of assistance that any individual can pro­
vide in the situation outlined in Weingarten is limited and can cer­
tainly be performed by a fellow employee. A coworker can assist 
by eliciting favorable facts and even, perhaps, save production 
time by helping to get to the bottom of the problem that occa­
sioned the interview. Certainly, that an employee is not part of a 
represented unit does not alter the real possibility that a single 
employee, confronted by an employer investigating conduct which 
may result in discipline, may be too fearful or inarticulate to de­
scribe accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant 
to raise ex!enuating factors as was noted in Weingarten . . . More­
over, a coworker who has witnessed employer action and can ac­
curately inform coemployees may diminish any tendency by an 
employer to act unjustly or arbitrarily. 
It is for the employee himself to determine whether the pres­
ence of a coworker at an investigatory interview provides some 
measure of protection. Here, [the employee], apparently believed 
it did. We would not substitute our judgment for that of employ­
ees who have shown that they believe that the presence of a co­
216. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1405. In concluding that a request for 
union representation constituted concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, the 
Weingarten Court found that the common interest served by a union representative 
made such activity, in terms of the applicability of section 7, analagous to that found in 
NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942). The 
Weingarten Court stated that 
[w]hen all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow 
workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they 
engage in a 'concerted activity' for 'mutual aid or protection,' although the ag­
grieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the 
outcome. The rest know that by their action each one of them assures himself, 
in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom they are all then 
helping; and the solidarity so established is 'mutual aid' in the most literal 
sense, as nobody doubts. 
420 U.S. at 261 (quoting NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 
503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942». 
To argue that the same does not apply to unrepresented employees turns on its head 
the rationale for Weingarten's holding that a request for union representation falls within 
the ambit of section 7. 
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worker lends a measure of meaningful protection.217 
2. The Status of the Union 
The Weingarten Court's holding that the representation or 
assistance rendered by a union agent to an employee constitutes con­
certed activity for mutual aid or protection is, as noted above,218 
predicated on the union's agent's serving not only the interests of the 
particular employee, but the interests of all employees in the bar­
gaining unit. It therefore follows that, before section 7 obligates an 
employer to accede to a request for union representation, the union 
must be in a position to claim the right to serve the entire bargaining 
unit. In both Glomac and Anchortank, the Board determined the 
applicability of section 7 to a request for union representation at a 
time when the employer was denying or challenging the union's sta­
tus as the representative of unit employees. 
In Glomac, the union had been certified by the Board and rec­
ognized by the employer. In the context of unlawful, bad faith bar­
gaining, however, _ the employer denied an employees request for 
union representation, informing the employee that she did not have 
a union and that the employer did not recognize one.219 In adopting 
the administrative law judge's finding that the employee nevertheless 
had a section 7 right to union representation, the Board noted that 
this right could not be dependent on the employer's refusal to ac­
knowledge the union's status as the employees' chosen 
representative. 
We do not draw a distinction between union-represented employ­
ees and employees who have chosen union representation but 
have been deprived of the benefits of that representation as a re­
sult of the employer's refusal to bargain in good faith with their 
designated representative. 
The national labor policy of encouraging good-faith collec­
tive bargaining would be undermined if an employer were to be 
217. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1405-06. The section 7 right of "em­
ployees" to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection should not guaran­
tee a right to representation by an individual not an employee of the employer solely on 
the grounds that such individual is an employee of someone. Unlike the non-employee 
union agent, such individual cannot claim to represent the interests of the unit as a 
whole. Further, an employer's property rights should not, on balance, be required to give 
way to the presence of a non-employee where there exist other employees of the em­
ployer capable of fulfilling the request for a representative. See supra note 107. See also 
Sentry Investigation Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 926, 936 n.20 (1980). 
218. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
219. 234 N.L.R.B. at 1311. 
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allowed to defeat its employee's right to have a representative 
present by engaging in unlawful bad-faith bargaining which the 
employer could then rely on to assert that no recognized union 
representative exists. To permit the Respondent's own miscon­
duct thus to reduce or eliminate the employee's right to have a 
union representative present is to allow the Respondent's unlawful 
action to determine the reach and applicability of Section 7 rights. 
We cannot reward the wrongdoer for conduct which violated Sec­
tion 8(a)(5) of the ACt.220 
In Anchortank, the Board again found that it was the union's 
actual status as the chosen majority representative of the employee's 
that was determinative of the section 7 right to union representation. 
Thete, the union had won a representation election but, unlike 
G/omac, had not yet been certified by the Board or recognized by the 
employer.221 The administrative law judge had found that, inas­
much as the employer was under no obligation to bargain with the 
union at the time of the interview, employees had no section 7 right 
to the assistance of the union.222 In reversing the administrative law 
judge, the Board found that, given the employee's selection of the 
union, its lack of certification or recognition was irrelevant. 
The central issue of the Weingarten decision was whether the em­
ployee's Section 7 right to engage in concerted activity extended to 
the encounter between employee and employer in an interview 
which could reasonably result in disciplinary action. In that case, 
the concerted activity took the specific form of a request for assist­
ance from a statutory representative. However, the Court and the 
Board placed the emphasis upon the employee's right to act con­
certedly for protection in the face of a threat to job security, and 
not upon the right to be represented by a duly designated collec­
tive bargaining representative. 
. . . Here, [the employees] requested union representation at 
a time when the Union had been selected by a majority of em­
ployees in a Board-conducted election, but had not yet been certi­
fied as bargaining representative. Their request was an exercise of 
the right guaranteed to them by Section 7 to act in concert for 
mutual aid or protection. In these circumstances, the status of the 
requested representative, whether it be that of a union not yet cer­
tified or simply that of fellow employee, does not operate to de­
prive the employees of the rights which they enjoy by virtue of the 
220. Id. at 1310-11. Accord Brown & Connolly. Inc .• 237 N.L.R.B. 271 (1978). 
221. 239 N.L.R.B. at 431. 
222. Id. at 434. 
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plain mandate in Section 7.223 
The statement of the Board in Anchortank regarding the status 
of the requested representative as being either a noncertified union 
or a fellow employee leaves open the question of whether a lack of 
certification or recognition would deprive an employee of the repre­
sentation of a nonemployee union agent. For in balancing the inter­
ests of employers and employees under section 7, the Board has 
accorded greater weight to an employer's property rights when the 
activity of nonemployee union agents is involved.224 The Board has 
yet to be faced squarely with a case involving the denial of a request 
for representation by a nonemployee agent of a union not yet certi­
fied. However, it would appear that employees' choice of the union 
as the representative, an act which allows the union to claim the 
right to represent the interests of all the bargaining unit members, 
would still be the determinative factor and at least one federal ap­
peals court has so found. 
In enforcing, with modifications,225 the decision of the Board in 
Anchortank, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an 
employee had no right to union representation by a nonemployee 
union agent before the union wins a representation election.226 The 
court also found, however, that an employer acts at its peril if, fol­
lowing a representation election won by the union, it denies a re­
quest for representation by a nonemployee union agent.227 The 
court reasoned as follows: 
The situation is radically altered, however, after a representa­
tion election is held, and the union is victorious, even if that vic­
tory is challenged. At that point, the request of the employee for 
union representation takes on an entirely different character; the 
nature of the activity changes. No longer is the employee asking 
for the participation of a nonemployee who is in a position to rep­
223. Id at 430. Accord PPG Industries, 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980); Good Samari­
tan Nursing Home, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 207 (1980). 
224. See generally NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (em­
ployers can restrict non-employee union organizers' access to employer property in situa­
tions where it would be improper to so restrict employee union organizers). 
225. The Fifth Circuit remanded to the Board the issue of whether a particular 
interview involved in the case fell within the Board's decision in Baton Rouge Water. 
Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d IIS3, 1169 (5th Cir. 1980). 
226. Id at 1163. The same would seem to hold true regarding a request for repre­
sentation by a fellow employee acting in the capacity of a union agent. Since a Wein­
garten representative, however, does not perform the role of a collective bargaining 
representative, the distinction is of no practical importance. 
227. Id at 1162. 
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resent only the employee's individual interest . . . . After the 
union has won the election, the employee quite properly perceives 
his request to be one for the concerted mutual aid and protection 
of his fellow employees, for the union then stands in for all the 
unit employees.228 
The court further contended that: 
We believe that this situation is analogous to that in which 
the employer, in the face of a union's challenged election victory, 
unilaterally changes conditions of employment that are 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. In such a situation, prior to 
resolution of the election challenge, the employer may assert his 
prerogative to manage his plant without interference at the risk 
that his conduct will violate section 8(a)(5) if the union has indeed 
won the election and is later certified.229 
To the extent that the Fifth Circuit opinion in Anchortank holds 
that an employee's right to union representation stems from the 
union's status as the chosen representative of unit employees, it is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's view of the union representative 
as serving the interests of the entire bargaining unit. On that basis, 
the finding that the employer may exclude nonemployee union 
agents until the union obtains such status represents a reasonable 
accommodation between employer property rights and the em­
ployee's right to seek and engage in concerted activity for mutual aid 
or protection. Further, since it is the union's status as the chosen 
representative, that gives rise to the right to union representation, it 
is likewise proper to hold that the employer only act at its peril if it 
denies a request for representation by a nonemployee union agent, 
and not to be found to have restrained section 7 rights if, ultimately, 
the union's election victory is overtumed.230 
However, a representation election is not the sole method for 
determining employee choice of a representative. Under NLRB v. 
Gissel Packing CO.,231 the Board will look to a union's designation 
228. Id 
229. Id at 1164-65. 
230. As the court noted, this principle is supported by Board law holding that an 
employer acts at its peril if, following an election but prior to the union's certification, the 
employer unilaterally changes terms and conditions of employment. See Mike 
O'Connor Chevrolet-Buick-GMC, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 701 (1974). 
As the court also pointed out, the protected nature of the employee's request does 
not depend on whether or not the union is ultimately certified because in making the 
request, the employee is nonetheless initiating group action. Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 
618 F.2d 1153, 1165 n.22 (5th Cir. 1980). 
231. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See also Peaker Run Coal Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 93 (1977); 
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pursuant to authorization cards in circumstances where an em­
ployer's unfair labor practices have rendered invalid an election a 
union has lost and, depending on the seriousness of those unfair la­
bor practices, will order bargaining based on the union's designation 
through authorization cards. Since, in Gissel-type cases, the union is 
found to be the chosen representative on the basis of authorization 
cards, the right to union representation should also attach, in the 
same circumstances, on the basis of the card designation. Thus, if 
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Anchortank is read always to require a 
union election victory before representation by a nonemployee 
union agent is guaranteed, Gissel-type situations would be ignored· 
and the right to union representation would be overly restricted. 
3. The Role of the Representative 
The Supreme Court noted that the nature of the section 7 right 
affirmed in Weingarten required certain limitations on the assistance 
or representation provided by the Weingarten representative. The 
most significant limitation is that the employer need not bargain 
with any representative who may attend the interview and that the 
representative may not "use the powers conferred upon the union by 
its designation as collective-bargaining representative."232 The Wein­
garten Court also noted that the exercise of the right could not inter­
fere with legitimate employer prerogatives and that the employer 
was under no obligation to proceed with an interview in the face of a 
request for representation.233 The Court therefore recognized that, 
through the exercise of its legitimate prerogatives, an employer could 
restrict the activity of the representative: ''The representative is pres­
ent to assist the employee, and attempt to clarify the facts or suggest 
other employees who may have knowledge of them. The employer, 
however, is free to insist that he is only interested, at that time, in 
hearing the employee's account of the matter under investiga­
tion."234 A third limitation on the role of the representative 
stemmed from the Court's view of investigatory interviews as being 
preliminary to the disciplinary process and presenting, therefore, the 
opportunity only for informal, nonadversarial exchange: 
A single employee confronted by an employer investigating 
Drug Package Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 108 (1977), enforced in parI, 570 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 
1978). 
232. See supra text accompanying note 208. 
233. 420 U.S. at 258. 
234. Id at 260. 
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whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or 
inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or 
too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable union 
representative could assist the employer by eliciting facts, and 
save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the 
incident occasioning the interview. Certainly his presence need 
not transform the interview into an adversary contest.235 
The Court's view of the role of the representative, especially in 
terms of the employer's ability to affect that role by limiting the in­
terview, led dissenting Justices Powell and Stewart to comment that 
the right to representation as defined by the Court appeared to be of 
little value to the employee, perhaps limited to that of a silent wit­
ness.236 Nevertheless, it is clear that, in describing the assistance that 
a Weingarten representative could render,237 the Court did envision 
some active role. Further, the essence of Weingarten is that, to the 
extent an employer chooses to conduct an interview, it is obligated 
upon request to allow for the exercise of concerted activity between 
the employee and his representative.238 
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,239 the Board held that an 
employer could not, at the outset of interview, restrict the role of the 
Weingarten representative to that of a mere witness.24O There, the 
employer demanded that the requested union representative not 
speak during the interview and argued that the restriction was per­
mitted by the Supreme Court's Weingarten statement that the em­
ployer was "free to insist that he is only interested, at the time, in 
hearing the employee's own account of the matter under investiga­
tion."241 Nevertheless, the Board found that this employer right had 
to be balanced against the employee's right to the assistance and 
235. Id at 262-63. 
236. Id at 273 n.5 (Powell & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). 
237. Id at 263-64. 
238. While the silent presence of the representative could be construed as con­
certed activity for mutual aid or protection, the issue is whether the employer's exercise 
of legitimate prerogatives may restrict the concerted activity of the representative and 
employee to silent presence only. 
239. 251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1980), enforcement denied, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982). 
240. Id at 613. Accord United Technologies Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. No. 196, 110 
L.R.R.M. 1017 (1982); Texaco Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633, enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 
1981). In enforcing Texaco, Inc. the Ninth Circuit adopted the Board's view. 659 F.2d 
at 126. In denying enforcement of Southwestern Bell, the Fifth Circuit found, on the 
facts, that the representative had been allowed to participate during the interview. 667 
F.2d at 473. The Fifth Circuit expressly distinguished its view of the facts in Southwest­
ern Bell from those presented in Texaco, Inc. , where it was found that the representative 
was not allowed any participation. Id at 474 n.3. 
241. 251 N.L.R.B. at 613 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260). 
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counsel of the representative.242 For it was through this right that 
the employee and representative engaged in concerted activity for 
mutual aid or protection and to preclude any assistance by the repre­
sentative was, in effect, to preclude the exercise of the Weingarten 
right. The Board therefore found that the employer's legitimate pre­
rogative to regulate the role of the representative could not extend 
beyond a reasonable prevention of collective bargaining or an adver­
sary confrontation, both of which were viewed by the Supreme 
Court as outside the permissible role of the representative and the 
context in which the interview took place.243 Since the employer had 
attempted to silence the representative at the outset of the interview, 
its actions could not be construed as being reasonably related to 
avoiding either collective bargaining over possible discipline or 
avoiding an adversary contest. The Board therefore found the re­
striction to constitute unwarranted interference with the employee's 
section 7 right to representation.244 
The exact nature of reasonable prevention of collective bargain­
ing or an adversary conflict has not yet been addressed by the Board 
but would, of course, depend on the particular circumstances of each 
case. Southwestern Bell does, at least, stand for the proposition that 
an employer must allow some active role for the representative by 
which the representative assists the employee while not necessarily 
speaking for him. 245 
D. Waiver ofthe Right 
The Weingarten Court recognized that the right to representa­
tion, as an individual section 7 right, could only be exercised if in­
voked by the employee.246 The Court also held that once invoked, 
242. 251 N.L.R.B. at 613. 
243. Id 
244. Id 
245. Id at 615. In denying enforcement of Southwestern Bell, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the employer had allowed the representative to participate at the end of the 
interview. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1982). It 
could be argued that restricting the representative's participation until after the employee 
has given "his own account of the matter under investigation" unduly restricts the em­
ployee's right to assistance and representation. While the representative may be pre­
vented from speaking for the employee, an employee who is either "too fearful or 
inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated" would be better served 
by assistance that is rendered to him prior to or during the giving of his own account and 
that aids him in presenting that account. See Pacific Tel. And Tel. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 
110 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1982); Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1189-90 (1977), 
enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978). 
246. 420 U.S. at 257. 
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the right could be waived by the employee.247 Thus, the Court noted 
that the employer could offer the employee a choice of an interview 
without representation or no interview at all and, if the employee 
chose the former, he would forgo any benefit that might be derived 
from the interview.248 In post-Weingarten cases, the Board has de­
cided what constitutes a valid waiver of the right to representation, 
finding that the waiver must be made not only knowingly, but also 
voluntarily. 
In Super Valu Xenia, 249 the Board adopted an administrative 
law judge's decision rejecting the employer's contention that an em­
ployee waived his right to representation by attending the interview 
after the request for representation had been denied. The adminis­
trative law judge noted that, under Weingarten, an employer could 
not conduct an interview after denying the employee's request for 
representation without first affording the employee the choice of an 
interview without representation or no interview at all.250 Absent 
the offering of such choice, the employee could not be presumed to 
either have been aware of it or have made it: 
The fact that [the employee] stayed, and answered the questions 
put to him, did not make his participation voluntary or constitute 
a waiver of his right to union representation. It should not be 
requisite to the continued maintenance of the properly asserted 
right of union representation that the lone employee further an­
tagonize the employer and jeopardize his job by walking out of 
the meeting or by refusing to answer questions.251 
In Postal Service ,252 the Board held that a waiver of Weingarten 
rights could not be inferred from an express waiver of "Miranda" 
rights,253 inasmuch as the Weingarten right to representation has a 
different foundation and purpose than the constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. The Board again noted that, unless the 
employee is offered the choice of an interview without representation 
247. Id. at 257. 
248. Id. 420 U.S. at 258. 
249. 236 N.L.R.B. 1581 (1978), enforcement denied, 627 F.2d I3 (6th Cir. 1981). 
250. Id. at 1591. 
251. Id. In denying enforcement of the Board's finding that the employer violated 
section 8(a)(I) by conducting the interview, the Sixth Circuit held that the employee had, 
in fact, waived his Weingarten rights by proceeding with the meeting. Super Valu Xenia 
v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 12, I3 (6th Cir. 1980). Such holding in inconsistent with the Wein­
garten decision itself, where the employee likewise failed to exercise self-help by refusing 
to participate in the interview. See 420 U.S. at 254. 
252. 241 N.L.R.B. 141 (1979). 
253. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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or not interview at all, a waiver of the right will not be found. 254 
Similarly, in Montgomery Ward & Co. ,255 the Board adopted an 
administrative law judge's finding that the following signed state­
ments were insufficient to waive Weingarten rights: "I agree that 
representatives of Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., may interview me, 
commencing from the time designated below, on matters relating to 
company business. It is fully understood that I am free to leave this 
interview at any time I so desire."256 
The administrative law judge noted that although an employer 
was under no burden to inform an employee of his right to union 
representation, an alleged waiver which did not specifically refer to 
union representation lacked the specificity to render it effective. 257 
In Southwestern Bell,258 a Board majority found that an em­
ployee must waive his right to representation voluntarily.259 There, 
employees were told in response to their requests for representation 
that, inasmuch as granting the requests would require that higher 
management officials be called in, more severe discipline might be 
meted out.260 The Board concluded that the employees' subsequent 
attendance at the interviews did not indicate a voluntary waiver of 
their rights, but rather one which resulted from unlawful coercion: 
Weingarten does not require that after having made his request, 
an employee must remain adamant in the face of predictions of 
dire ultimate consequences. The Employer's threat that the exer­
cise of the right to representation would lead to more severe disci­
pline or that the employee's fate would be in more capricious and 
hostile hands is no less interference and restraint than an outright 
denial of his right.261 
Indeed, as the majority noted, to "conclude that an employer may 
play upon these fears to dissuade an employee from remaining firm 
in his request would defeat the right Weingarten protects."262 
While the employee may waive his individual section 7 right to 
engage in concerted activity, the Board has yet to decide whether a 
254. 241 N.L.R.B. at 141. 
255. 254 N.L.R.B. 826 (1981), enforcement denied in part, 664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 
1981). 
256. Id at 828. 
257. Id at 831. 
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union can, by contract, waive the right on behalf of employees.263 
While the issue has been raised in a number of cases, the Board has 
either found that it was not necessary to decide it264 or that the al­
leged waivers involved were not, in any event, clear and unmistaka­
ble.265 While the Supreme Court did not address the issue in 
Weingarten,266 at least one federal appeals court has found that a 
. contractual waiver did operate to deny the employees their right to 
union representation. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. 
NLRB,267 the Fifth Circuit found, contrary to the Board, that the 
union had, in fact waived the employees' right to union representa­
tion.268 The court further found that such waiver was effective: 
Identifying the Weingarten right as an individual right does not 
mean that it cannot be contractually waived by the union. A 
union is allowed a great deal of flexibility in serving its bargaining 
unit during contract negotiations. It makes concessions and ac­
cepts advantages it believes are in the best interest of the employ­
ees it represents. . . . This. . . includes the right of the union to 
waive some employee rights, even the employee's individual statu­
tory rights. . . . Courts which have invalidated a clear contrac­
tual waiver of an employee's individual statutory right have done 
so only when the waived right affects the employee's right to exer­
cise his basic choice of bargaining representative.269 
In light of the Fifth Circuit's opinion, the Board is currently 
reconsidering its decision in a second case involving the same parties 
and the same contractual provision, and presumably will state its po­
sition on the effect of contractual waivers of Weingarten rights. In 
light of the pending issue before the Board, it would not be appropri­
ate to indicate whether I would agree or disagree with that court's 
view of a union's authority in this regard. I note, however, the issue 
that I perceive to be involved. 
A union has no statutory right to be present at a Weingarten 
263. In a pre-Weingarten case, former Chairman Miller indicated that he believed 
a union could waive an employee's Weingarten right. See Western Elee. Co., 198 
N.L.R.B. 1623, 625 (1972). 
264. See Airco Alloys, 249 N.L.R.B. 524 (1980); Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 
246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979). 
265. See United States Postal Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 78 (1981), enforcement denied on 
other grounds, 689 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982); Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 254 N.L.R.B. 
247 (1981); Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 251 N.L.R.B. 1591 (1980), enforcement de­
nied, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). 
266. See 420 U.S. at 275 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
267. 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). 
268. Id at 400. 
269. Id at 400-01 (citations omitted). 
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interview and, therefore, has no right to waive on its own behalf. 
Nevertheless, the exercise of the Weingarten right requires that the 
requested representative be willing to assist the employee. It could 
therefore be that a union does have the power to agree, during the 
course of collective bargaining, that it will not provide the assistance 
of its agents and, in this sense, the union can be said to have waived 
the employees' right to union representation. Such an agreement, 
however, is not actually a waiver of the employees' section 7 right to 
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. An em­
ployee's request for union representation still falls within the protec­
tion of section 7 and his failure to obtain such assistance results only 
from the union's refusal to provide it and not from any waiver of his 
statutory right to seek it. 
The more important question raised by alleged contractual 
waivers of the Weingarten right is whether a union has the power to 
waive the employee's statutory right to engage in concerted activity 
for mutual aid or protection. If so, the union could not only deny an 
employee the right to union representation but the right to represen­
tation or assistance by fellow employees as well. The above quoted 
language from the Prudential Insurance 270 decision would, of course, 
support an argument that a union has such authority. However, 
while a union's waiver of the employees' right to engage in concerted 
activity for mutual aid or protection as it relates to union representa­
tion may not "affect the employee's right to exercise his basic choice 
of bargaining representative,"271 it may be that the same does not 
hold true in the case of the union's waiver of the right as it relates to 
the representation and assistance provided by fellow employees. In 
each instance that a union restricts the right of employees to engage 
in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection apart from the 
union, such restriction benefits the union qua union. This is so be­
cause as a result of the restriction, employees are thereby locked into 
the union as the sole vehicle by which they may engage in concerted 
activity for mutual aid or protection and are denied the opportunity 
to test the benefits of unionism against whatever benefits they might 
gain by concerted action without a union.272 To this extent, the 
union's waiver of the employees' section 7 right to the representation 
and assistance of fellow employees does affect employee choice in 
regard to whether employees would choose to be represented at 
270. See supra text accompanying note 270. 
271. 661 F.2d at 401. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974); NLRB v. 
Mid-States Metal Prods., Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968). 
272. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). 
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all.273 
Even if it were assumed that a union does have the power to 
waive the employees' right to representation by a fellow employee, 
the waiver of such a fundamental right is not lightly inferred. There­
fore, a contractual clause which purports to waive union representa­
tion should not operate to waive the right to representation by fellow 
employees, and the effect of such waiver of union representation 
only should be no more than to deny the employee the assistance of 
nonemployee union agents.274 
E. The Scope ofthe Right 
As discussed in the first section of this article,275 the Supreme 
Court's decision in Weingarten affirmed the Board's interpretation of 
the scope of the section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for 
mutual aid or protection as set out in Quality Manufacturing and Mo­
bilOil that section 7 guaranteed the right not only to insist upon, but 
to have, union representation at investigatory interviews at which the 
reasonable fear of discipline obtained. The right to engage in con­
certed activity, however, guarantees more than just the specific rights 
affirmed in Weingarten. As Materials Research illustrates, the right 
is not limited to union representation but applies to representation 
by fellow employees as well.276 Under Baton Rouge Water, the right 
is not necessarily limited to purely investigatory interviews.277 Fur­
ther, as illustrated by Quality Manufacturing, section 7 protects not 
only the employee who requests or insists upon representation; at­
tempts that are likewise concerted activity for mutual aid or 
protection.278 
Two important post-Weingarten decisions made by the Board 
273. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974). 
274. A request for a union steward who is also a fellow employee is still a request 
for representation by a fellow employee. A union, of course, may agree to deny an em­
ployee the services of its stewards as stewards. As previously noted, however, a Wein­
garten "representative" does not act as a collective bargaining representative and 
therefore may do no more than that which can be done by a fellow employee. See supra 
note 208 and accompanying text. See also Los Angeles Water Treatment, 263 NLRB 
No. 22, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1115,109, at 25,386 (Aug. 9, 1982). Compare NLRB 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), with the Fifth 
Circuit's discussion of the right to be represented by a fellow employee as opposed to a 
non-employee union agent in Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1162-65 (5th 
Cir. 1980). 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70. 
276. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1405. 
277. 246 N.L.R.B. at 997. 
278. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-99. 
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indicate the broad scope of the right to engage in concerted activity 
as it relates to interviews to which the reasonable fear of discipline 
obtains. In Climax Molybdenum,279 a Board majority280 held that 
the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection 
guarantees an employee a right to consult with his representative 
before the interview. The majority noted that the Supreme Court's 
discussion of a knowledgeable representative in Weingarten dictated 
that the right to representation include a right to prior consultation: 
[T]he representative's aid in eliciting the facts can be performed 
better, and perhaps only, if he can consult with the employee be­
forehand. To preclude such advance discussion ... seems to us 
to thwart one of the purposes approved in Weingarten. Nothing in 
the rationale of Weingarten suggests that, in its endorsement of the 
role of a "knowledgeable union representative," the Supreme 
Court meant to put blinders on the union representative by deny­
ing him the opportunity of learning the facts by consultation with 
the employee prior to the investigatory-disciplinary interview. 
Knowledgeability implies the very opposite. The right to repre­
sentation clearly embraces the right to prior consultation.281 
The majority also rejected the contentions of the dissenters that 
allowing for a consultation between the employee and his Wein­
garten representative would impede the investigation process and 
transform the interview into an adversary contest contrary to the 
Supreme Court's admonition: 
The greater knowledgeability acquired by prior consultation obvi­
ously does not alter the nature of the interview but only advances 
the fact finding process. Nor will prior consultation, as the dissent 
suggests, cause unions to bring "pressures to bear on an employee 
to withhold the facts." [T]he fact remains that a union representa­
tive so inclined could engage in such conduct about as effectively 
at the interview as in talks with the employee prior to the inter­
view. If we had to speculate, we would guess that lack of prior 
279. 227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977), enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (lOih Cir. 1978). 
280. Member Jenkins, former Chairman Murphy and former Member Fanning 
composed the majority. Former Members Penello and Walther dissented. In his concur­
ring opinion, former Member Fanning stated that prior consultation was "not something 
different than, [sic) nor superior to, the act of representation itself; it is simply an aspect 
of that function which enables the representative to fulfill its role," 227 N.L.R.B. at 1191 
(Member Fanning, concurring). He further pointed out that since "consultation" was 
likewise concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, it mattered not, once the request 
for representation was granted, whether the employee or representative sought the con­
sultation. Id at 1191-92. 
281. Id at 1190. 
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consultation would strongly incline an employee representative to 
those obstructionist tactics as a precautionary means of protecting 
employees from unknown possibilities. Perhaps all we are sug­
gesting is that knowledge is a better basis . . . for the successful 
carrying out of labor-management relations.282 
Recently, in Pac!fic Telephone & Telegraph Co. ,283 a Board ma­
jority284 held that the right to prior consultation includes a right to 
be informed as to the subject of the interview as well.285 Without 
such information, the employee and representative have nothing 
about which to consult and, therefore, the right to consultation found 
in Climax Molybdenum,286 in effect, would be denied. In response to 
a dissent by Member Hunter,287 the Board majority took occasion to 
reaffirm the holding of Climax Molybdenum: 
Prior consultation, and the knowledge which results therefrom, 
enables the representative to "assist the Employer by eliciting 
favorable facts and save the Employer production time by getting 
to the bottom of the incident." At the same time, it enables the 
representative to counsel and assist the employee ... [and] pro­
vide the aid or protection which the employee seeks. 
. . . Indeed, the act of "consultation" is no less "concerted 
activity for mutual aid or protection" than the act of representa­
tion itself. It is likewise activity aimed at countering employer ac­
tion which threatens the employee's terms and conditions of 
employment. Moreover, it need not interfere with legitimate em­
ployer prerogatives any more than the act of representation. 
When faced with an employee's insistence on concerted action, the 
Employer is still free to reject the collective course and forego the 
interview. Further, the Employer controls the manner, form, and 
timing of its investigatory and disciplinary process and can take 
steps to protect its legitimate interests while at the same time give 
282. Id 
283. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, liD L.R.R.M. 1411 (1982). 
284. Members Jenkins, Zimmerman and Fanning composed the majority. 
285. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412. 
286. In denying enforcement of Climax Molybdenum, the Tenth Circuit relied on 
the fact that the employees involved were aware of the interviews 17 1/2 hours in ad­
vance, but had not sought to consult with the representative on their own time; that the 
employees had not requested representation; and that the union had an express policy of 
informing employees not to cooperate in such interviews. Climax Molybdenum Co. v. 
NLRB, 584 F.2d 360, 362-65 (10th Cir. 1978). These facts were not present in Pac(/ic Tel 
& Tel See 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412 n.5. 
287. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1413 (Member Hunter, dissenting). 
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due regard to the exercise of Section 7 rights.288 
In response to Member Hunter's assertion that finding a right to 
prior consultation and information transformed investigatory inter­
views into formalized adversarial contests with all the attributes of 
full-scale criminal proceedings, the majority outlined certain limita­
tions on those rights: 
All Climax requires is that, as a function of an employee's right to 
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, a 
preinterview consultation with his Weingarten representative be 
permitted. This consultation need be nothing more than that 
which provides the representative an opportunity to become fa­
miliar with the employee's circumstances. To require that the 
Employer inform the employee as to the subject matter of the in­
terview does not dictate anything resembling "discovery." The 
Employer does not have to reveal its case, the information it has 
obtained, or even the specifics of the misconduct to be discussed. 
A general statement as to the subject matter of the interview, 
which identifies to the employee and his representative the mis­
conduct for which discipline may be imposed, will suflice.289 
The Board's interpretation of the scope of section 7 in Climax 
Molybdenum andPaciftc Telephone represents the same balancing of 
interests which resulted in the Weingarten right. Essential to the 
striking of that balance is the Board's view that prior consultation 
and information regarding the subject of the interview enables the 
representation contemplated by Weingarten to take place,29o con­
ceivably aids the employer,291 and is only a limited burden on the 
employer's investigatory process.292 Any burden, in fact, is really no 
more than the burden caused by representation itself. As such, it is a 
balance struck "in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the 
288. Id, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412 (footnotes omitted). Pacific Tel & Tel involved 
an investigation of two employees for a single incident of theft. In his dissent, Member 
Hunter argued that allowing for prior consultation with the union representative before 
each employee's separate interview could defeat the employer's legitimate interest in 
preventing the employees, through the single representative, from fabricating consistent 
accounts of their activities. Id, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1415 (Member Hunter, dissenting). 
Such interest on the part of the employer, however, could be readily served by providing 
a different representative for each employee. Such would be a reasonable restriction on 
the employees' choice of representative, in light of the circumstances of the investigation, 
and would serve both the employees' right to representation and the employer's legiti­
mate interests in conducting its investigation. 
289. Id. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1413 (footnote omitted). 
290. Id, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412. 
291. Id 
292. Id 
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end to be attained."293 
When an employee requests or insists upon representation at a 
Weingarten interview, he is attempting to engage in concerted activ­
ity for mutual aid or protection and, therefore, the request is pro­
tected by section 7.294 However, conduct which would otherwise 
amount to protected activity may lose the protection of the Act de­
pending on the manner in which it is carried out. In a number of 
post-Weingarten decisions, the Board has passed on the protected 
nature of certain employee actions aimed at enforcing Weingarten 
rights. 
In Spartan Stores, Inc. ,295 the Board held that section 7 pro­
tected an employee's attempts to obtain his union steward at the out­
set of an investigatory interview. There, the employee was 
summoned to his supervisor's office and questioned as to the reason 
for his leaving an employee meeting earlier that day. The employee, 
believing that he was to be disciplined, walked out of the office, stat­
ing that he was going to get his union steward. Despite supervisory 
requests that he remain, the employee obtained the steward and re­
turned to the office, whereupon he was discharged for refusing to 
obey orders.296 The Board concluded that the employee's actions 
amounted to a refusal to participate in a Weingarten interview ab­
sent representation and was therefore protected.297 The Board, not­
ing that the employee returned within two minutes, heavily relied 
upon the fact that, contrary to established practice, the employee's 
supervisors neither summoned the steward nor gave the employee 
any indication that they would do SO.298 
In General Electric Co. ,299 the Board indicated that an em­
ployee's attempts to exercise self-help by obtaining his steward 
would not be protected where, unlike Spartan Stores, the supervisor 
indicated that he would summon the steward for the employee. By 
indicating that the steward would be called, the supervisor had, in 
fact, granted the employee's request. The Board therefore concluded 
293. Id; 420 u.s. at 262. The Board has found, however, that Weingarten does not 
encompass a request to produce witnesses at an investigatory interview. Coyne Cylinder 
Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1503, 1504 n.6 (1980). 
294. ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. at 280-81. 
295. 235 N.L.R.B. 522 (1978), enforcement denied, 628 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1980). 
296. Id at 522. 
297. Id at 522-23. Similarly, the Board has held that an outburst by an employee 
in the course of insisting on representation was protected by section 7. Roy H. Park 
Broadcasting, 255 N.L.R.B. 229, 230-34 (1981). 
298. 235 N.L.R.B. at 522. 
299. 240 N.L.R.B. 479 (1980). 
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that the employee's self-help, in direct contravention of his supervi­
sor's order, could not be in furtherance of his right to refuse to par­
ticipate in the interview without representation.3°O 
In Roadway Express,301 a Board majority found that an em­
ployee's refusal to leave the plant floor to attend a Weingarten inter­
view was unprotected. There, the employee was directed to his 
supervisor's office following an altercation, but refused to report ab­
sent his union steward.302 The majority concluded that the em­
ployer's right to maintain discipline on the plant floor privileged its 
disciplining of the employee for his refusal: 
In Weingarten, it was the Supreme Court's design that, on the one 
hand, an employee not be compelled to participate in an investiga­
tory interview in the absence of union representation while, on the 
other hand, exercise ofthe employee's right may not interfere with 
legitimate employer prerogatives. The two concepts are not mutu­
ally exclusive, of course, and we do not believe that preservation 
of the former must necessarily result in the derogation of the lat­
ter. Simply stated, we find that an employee's Weingarten rights, 
with all its attendant safeguards, matures at the commencement of 
the interview, be it on the production floor or in a supervisor's 
office. If the Employer chooses to initiate its investigation in a 
work area, then it is bound to comply immediately with an em­
ployee's request for representation there. If, however, the Em­
ployer as here, asks the employee to leave the production area and 
go to an office or some other location where further discussion is 
contemplated, then the employee acts at his or her peril if she de­
clines to do SO.303 
Member Jenkins and I dissented, arguing that the majority's 
creation of a distinction between refusals to leave the plant floor and 
refusals to attend Weingarten interviews absent representation 
amounted to an arbitrary, procedural pitfall which seriously under­
mined the exercise of the Weingarten right.304 As we viewed the 
matter, the employee's refusal to report to the office absent his stew­
ard constituted an insistence upon representation at the upcoming 
interview and, absent some disruptive conduct accompanying that 
insistence,305 could not be rendered unprotected by section 7 merely 
300. Id at 481. 
301. 246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979). Former Members Penello, Murphy and Truesdale 
composed the majority. 
302. Id 
303. Id at 1128. See also Chrysler Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. lO50, lO53-55 (1979). 
304. 246 N.L.R.B. at 1131 (Member Jenkins and Chairman Fanning, dissenting). 
305. See Chrysler Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. lO50, 1052 n.8. 
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on the grounds of the employer's right to maintain discipline and 
order. In this regard, we noted that, if the employer's concern was 
merely to remove the employee from the plant floor and not to deny 
his request for representation, it could have so assured the employee 
or ordered the employee off the premises without an interview. Ab­
sent assurances, we saw no reason to place the burden of sorting out 
the employer's intentions on the employee, the individual least re­
sponsible for any ambiguity in that regard. Rather, we found that 
the employee could, under the circumstances, reasonably believe 
that reporting to the office would result in his being questioned with­
out representation: 
The only discernible employer interest involved in being able to 
force an employee off the plant floor in this instance is that the 
Employer be given yet another chance to understand the illegality 
of its rejection of the Weingarten request. The majority's 
"preinterview discussion," during which an employer belatedly 
might attempt to respond lawfully to the employee's request, em­
bodies a mere speculation, and an ill-founded one, in view of the 
majority's recognition that the employee need not repeat his re­
quest at the actual interview. From the employee's perspective on 
the plant floor, there is no reason for him to believe that the Em­
ployer will relent from its unlawful stance once he leaves his work 
area, particularly where the site of the interview is but a few feet 
away. Accordingly, it is manifest that the majority requires the 
employee to do a futile act in order to preserve his right to assist­
ance. Such a holding seriously undercuts the protection of 
Weingarten .306 . 
In failing to require an employer to assure an employee who 
refuses to report to a meeting without representation that leaving the 
production area will not result in a denial of his request, the majority 
opinion in Roadway Express accords absolute protection to an em­
ployer's interest in avoiding disruption, while giving no weight to the 
employee's right to representation. Conversely, requiring an em­
ployer, in such circumstances, to assure an employee that his rights 
will be preserved is a minimal intrusion into an employer's right to 
maintain discipline and, therefore, would reasonably accommodate 
the interests of both sides. In this regard, Roadway Express is con­
trary to Spartan Stores and General Electric, where the protected na­
ture of employee self-help in furtherance of the Weingarten right was 
found to be dependent on the absence of assurances that the em­
306. 246 N.L.R.B. at 1131. 
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ployee's request for representation would be granted.307 
Recently, a Board majority seriously restricted the scope of sec­
tion 7 protections as they relate to concerted activity aimed at ob­
taining union representation. In Bridgeport Hospital30 8 the 
employer, following several incidents of vandalism, called a meeting 
of its security guards to discuss the problem. At the meeting, three 
guards insisted that their union representative be present and walked 
out of the meeting when their request was denied. The administra­
tive law judge reasoned that, inasmuch as the meeting was not one to 
which Weingarten rights attached, the guards had no right to a Wein­
garten representative and, therefore, no right to refuse to participate 
in the meeting absent such representation.309 The majority adopted 
the administrative law judge's conclusion that the guards had been 
lawfully disciplined for insubordination in walking out of the meet­
ing, finding that their right to act in concert to obtain the presence of 
the union representative was no broader than their statutory right 
thereto.310 
Member Jenkins and I dissented.3)) While Weingarten may 
have been inapplicable to the meeting inasmuch as it did not concern 
possible discipline,3)2 we noted that the statutory right to engage in 
concerted activity for mutual aid or protection is not limited to situa­
tions where the activity is aimed at enforcing a statutory right. Thus, 
while the employer in Bridgeport Hospital could lawfully deny the 
request for the presence of the union agent and conduct the meeting 
without him,3)3 that fact did not preclude the employees from engag­
ing in a concerted walkout to obtain the presence of the representa­
tive. As we viewed the matter, the presence of the union agent at 
307. See supra text accompanying notes 296-301. Likewise, the Board has found 
that employer assurances that a particular interview would not result in discipline are a 
significant factor in determining whether an employee has a reasonable fear of discipline 
in regard to the interview. See supra note 64. Roadway Express recently has been inter­
preted as involving a refusal to comply with a directive that resulted in a disruption or 
disturbance challenging supervisory authority. See E. I. Dupont De Nemours, 262 
N.L.R.B. No. 123, 110 L.R.R.M. 1417, 1419 n.5 (1982). The broad holding of Roadway 
Express, therefore, may be limited. 
308. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,371, at 26,142 (Nov. 
17, 1982). Chairman Van de Water, Member Zimmerman and Member Hunter com­
posed the majority. 
309. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,143. 
310. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,142. 
311. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,144 (Members Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting). 
312. See Northwest Eng'g, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 
15,311, at 26,013 (Oct. 22, 1982). 
313. An action that the existence of the statutory right to representation does not 
allow. 
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such a meeting was related to the interests of employees and a term 
and condition of employment.314 It was therefore a proper subject 
for concerted activity for mutual aid protection. In short, the walk­
out amounted to a strike for which the employees could not be 
disciplined.315 
In Bridgeport Hospital, the majority refused to view the em­
ployer's lawful denial of the request for the presence of the union 
agent as a term and condition of employment which could be the 
subject of a protected protest.316 This refusal was the direct result of 
a failure to discern the full scope of the section 7 right to engage in 
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection apart from the Wein­
garten context. For in finding that the existence of the Weingarten 
right determined the protected nature of the employees' walkout, the 
majority ignored the fact that the Weingarten right is no more than 
one application of section 7 as it relates to a specific set of circum­
stances. That such circumstances may not be present in a particular 
case does not, however, end the inquiry and determine the scope of 
section 7. It was the majority's failure to look beyond the Wein­
garten context in Bridgeport Hospital which lead it to interpret sec­
tion 7 in a manner "restrictive in its broad scope" and one which did 
"violence to its purposes. "317 
F. Remedy 
When an employee is disciplined because of an insistence upon 
or request for representation at a Weingarten interview, the disci­
pline is for the exercise of section 7 rights and the appropriate rem­
edy is restoration of the status quo ante, including expungement of 
the disciplinary record as well as reinstatement and backpay where 
applicable.318 
However, not all discipline occurring in Weingarten situations is 
314. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,144 (Members Jenkins and 
Fanning, dissenting). 
315. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1962). Of 
course, the employees in Bridgeport Hospital were no more entitled to the presence of 
their union agent than the employees in Washington Aluminum were entitled to a heated 
workplace, but the fact that an employer could lawfully resist such demands did not 
render the walkout in Bridgeport Hospital any less protected than the walkout in Wash· 
ington Aluminum. 
316. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,144. 
317. Glomac Plastics, 234 N.L.R.B. at 1311. 
318. ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1975). See also Salt River 
Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 262 N.L.R.B: No. 129, 110 L.R.R.M. 1396, 1396 (1982); 
United States Postal Serv., 237 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1104 n.l (1978), enforcement denied, 614 
F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980). 
65 1982) RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION 
motivated by the employee's attempt to exercise section 7 rights. In 
many cases, discipline which follows a Weingarten-violative inter­
view is for the underlying misconduct or performance which is the 
subject ofthe interview. In such alleged just cause discipline cases, it 
can be argued that the disciplinary decision is neither in response to 
the employee's exercise of Weingarten rights nor affected by the un­
derlying unlawful denial of representation. If so, restoration of the 
status quo ante would put the employee in a better position than he 
enjoyed before the unlawful interview and, therefore, would be inap­
propriate. Moreover, where discipline is suspension or discharge, 
any make-whole remedy for the underlying Weingarten violation 
must be consistent with section lO(c) of the Act which provides: "No 
order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual 
as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the pay­
ment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or 
discharged for cause."319 
However, to the extent that a disciplinary decision which fol­
lows a Weingarten-violative interview is based at all on that inter­
view, the discipline is not, in fact, for cause. Rather, the disciplinary 
decision has been tainted by the unlawful denial of representation, 
had for the employee been accorded his statutory rights, the decision 
might have been different. Nor should an employer be allowed to 
benefit from its derogation of an employee's statutory rights. Thus, 
on this theory, the Board, in several cases, ordered reinstatement and 
backpay for discharges viewed as the results of unlawful inter­
views.32o The discharge was considered to be outside the remedial 
restrictions of section lO(c) in that, as a result or effect of the unlaw­
ful interview, it came within the scope of the Board's remedial 
authority to wipe out the effects of unfair labor practices through 
restoration of the status quo ante.321 
The Board's result-of-one interview approach to the appropri­
ateness of make-whole remedies properly attempted to identify, as 
the basis for the remedy, a causal relationship between the underly­
ing unfair labor practice and the discipline. However, not all disci­
319. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). 
320. Anchortank, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. at 434-35; Potter Elec. Signal Co., 237 
N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 (1978), enforcement denied in parI, 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979); 
Super Valu Xenia, 236 N.L.R.B. at 1592; Southwestern Bell Tel., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1223 
n.1. 
321. Compare Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) wilh 
NLRB v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979) (section 10(c) prohibits 
Board from ordering reinstatement or back pay for employees discharged for obvious 
misconduct). 
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pline which follows an unlawful interview can be termed a result 
thereof. An interview may neither add to nor serve as confirmation 
of what the employer has learned independently. Although the fact 
that the interview was conducted cannot be erased from the em­
ployer's decisionmaking process, its contribution to the disciplinary 
decision may be insignificant. In short, while the interview may be a 
link in a causal chain which culminates in discipline, it is not a cause 
of the discipline in the sense that it is a factor in the decision or that 
the decision was based thereon. To exclude such interviews from 
application of a make-whole remedy requires a standard of causality 
which avoids a per se application by distinguishing between unlaw­
ful interviews which serve as an actual basis for discipline and those 
which do not. 
In Kraft Foods, Inc. ,322 a Board majority focused on the em­
ployer's reliance on information obtained in a WeIngarten-violative 
interview as the critical factor in determining whether or not there 
existed a direct causal relationship between interview and discipline 
sufficient to justify a make-whole remedy: 
In determining the appropriate remedy for a respondent's viola­
tion of an employee's Weingarten rights, the Board applies the fol­
lowing analysis. Initially, we determine whether the General 
Counsel has made a primafacie showing that a make-whole rem­
edy such as reinstatement, backpay, and expungement of all disci­
plinary records is warranted. The General Counsel can make this 
showing by proving that Respondent conducted an investigatory 
interview in violation of Weingarten and that the employee whose 
rights were violated was subsequently disciplined for the conduct 
which was the subject of the unlawful interview. 
In the face of such a showing, the burden shifts to the Re­
spondent. Thus, in order to negate the primafacie showing of the 
appropriateness of the make-whole remedy, the Respondent must 
demonstrate that its decision to discipline the employee in ques­
tion was not based on information obtained at the unlawful inter­
view. Where the Respondent meets its burden, a make-whole 
remedy will not be ordered. Instead, we will provide our tradi­
tional cease-and-desist order in remedy of the 8(a)(l) violation.323 
322. 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980). 
323. Id Former Members Penell(l and Truesdale and Chairman Fanning com­
posed the majority. Member Jenkins dissented from this aspect of the decision. He ar­
gued that, once a Weingarten-violative interview is followed by discipline, "it becomes 
virtually impossible to determine whether the disciplinary decision was based upon 'in­
formation' obtained at the unlawful interview." Id at 599. For Member Jenkins, the 
"impossibility" of the employer meeting its burden stemmed not as a result of the alloca­
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The Kraft Foods requirement that the employer has the burden 
of establishing that the discipline was not based on information ob­
tained during the unlawful interview recognizes the fact that it is the 
employer's wrongdoing that puts into issue what part, if any, the in­
terview plays in any disciplinary decision. Accordingly, it is for the 
wrongdoer to sort out the matter by showing that what is otherwise 
the appropriate remedy for an unfair labor practice is, in fact, inap­
propriate.324 However, the analysis makes it clear that, to the extent 
discipline is presumed to result from a prior unlawful interview, such 
a presumption is rebuttable.325 
Under Kraft Foods, an employer may establish that an inter­
view was not a cause of subsequent discipline by establishing that it 
did not base the discipline upon information it obtained during the 
interview, and therefore, that the discipline would have occurred ab­
tion of the burden, but rather from his belief that it was impossible not to base discipline 
on a prior interview. He thus viewed the Kraft Foods analysis as a useless and burden­
some test which would render a result no different from the per se test that the majority 
was rejecting. See id at 599-600. 
324. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 251 N .L.R.B. 1194, 1194 (1980), enforce­
ment denied in part, 676 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1982). 
325. In Kraft Foods, the majority found that the employer had, in fact, established 
that it did not base the discipline on any information it obtained during the unlawful 
interview. Noting that the unlawful interview entailed nothing more than the employee's 
denial that he had been engaged in a fight and the identification of a photograph depict­
ing the situs of a forklift collision, the majority concluded that the discipline had been 
based on information obtained independently by the employer. 251 N.L.R.B. at 599. 
The Board has also found that an employer met its Kraji Foods burden by establishing 
that the interview entailed nothing more than an employee's denial of guilt. Coyne Cyl­
inder Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1980). Further, the Board has found that an employer 
failed to meet its Kraft Foods burden where a confession of wrongdoing was obtained 
during the interview. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 932, 932-35 (1980); Texaco Inc., 
251 N.L.R.B. 633, 634-37 (1980). But if. United States Postal Serv., 254 N.L.R.B. 703 
(1981) (discharge based on information received from eyewitnesses). 
Establishing that a disciplinary decision was not based on information obtained dur­
ing an unlawful interview may, for the most part, be a function of establishing the in­
tended purpose of the interview and the use to which the information is to be put. If, by 
an interview, an employer sought to determine whether misconduct occurred, to confirm 
its suspicions as to an employee's participation in misconduct, or to assign fault, it is most 
likely that the employer based the discipline on the interview. On the other hand, if the 
employer acquired such information independently and conducted the interview merely 
to allow the employee to tell his side of the story, explain his conduct, or present mitigat­
ing factors, it is most likely that whatever information gained was only incidental to the 
disciplinary decision and obtained only for the purpose of concluding the case and pro­
viding a record for future use. For example, an employer is certainly capable of proving 
that it did not rely on a confession sought and obtained during an unlawful interview by 
establishing that it only sought the confession to strengthen its case regarding a subse­
quent grievance over the discharge or to support a criminal complaint, and not to deter­
mine whether the employee was in fact guilty of misconduct. 
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sent the interview. In this regard, however, information should not 
be read as limited to affirmative or tangible evidence. Rather, it is 
the existence of a direct causal relationship between interview and 
discipline that determines the appropriateness of the make-whole 
remedy. Reliance on statements, tangible evidence, or other affirma­
tive information is not the only way a direct causal relationship can 
exist. For example, it might be established in a particular case that 
the employer construed an employee's silence as an admission of 
guilt or was similarly persuaded on the basis of the employee's de­
meanor. In such a case, the degree to which discipline was based on 
what transpired during the interview may be no less than the case 
wherein actual information is obtained and relied upon. In fact, the 
causal link may be stronger. 
In Ohio Masonic Homes 326 a Board panel recognized this fact. 
There, an employee was subjected to a Weingarten-violative investi­
gatory interview following various complaints regarding her per­
formance and, subsequently, she was suspended. The Board 
concluded that the employer had failed to meet its burden of estab­
lishing that discipline was not based on information obtained during 
the interview. Rather, the Board found that the employee ''was sus­
pended because she did not have a satisfactory explanation in re­
sponse to the complaints, rather than merely because there had been 
some complaints."327 The Board therefore recognized that an em­
ployee's failure to offer a satisfactory explanation during an in­
terview may constitute information upon which a disciplinary 
decision is based.328 
The Ohio Masonic holding that an employee's failure to offer a 
satisfactory explanation may constitute "information" upon which 
discipline could be based should not be construed broadly. For to 
presume always that an employee's inability to exculpate himself 
during any unlawful interview is information upon which the disci­
plinary decision is based represents an adoption of the per se ap­
proach to make-whole remedies that Kraft Foods sought to avoid. 
Inherent in any decision to discipline is the fact that the employee 
has been unable to convince the employer that the discipline is un­
warranted. Employers do not generally discipline employees who 
have proffered satisfactory explanations or presented mitigating fac­
tors. Thus, to the extent that a disciplinary decision is presumed to 
326. 251 N.L.R.B. 606 (1980). 
327. Id at 607. 
328. Id 
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have been predicated on the employee's failure to offer a satisfactory 
explanation for the conduct under investigation, it is impossible for 
the employer to meet the Kraft Foods burden by establishing that it 
did not base discipline on information obtained during the unlawful 
interview.329 Ohio Masonic should therefore be strictly limited to sit­
uations where it has been affirmatively established that the em­
ployee's inability to proffer a satisfactory explanation was a 
determinative factor for the employer in establishing the employee's 
guilt.330 In this sense only can the employee's failure be properly 
construed as a direct cause of the discipline and one which precludes 
the employer from establishing that discipline would have occurred 
even absent the unlawful interview. 
The imposition of a make-whole remedy does not forever pre­
clude an employer from disciplining the employee for conduct that 
was the subject of the unlawful interview. All that the remedy effects 
is restoration of the status quo ante. The employee is still faced with 
the prospect of discipline just as he was prior to the unlawful inter­
view. Therefore, the employer can discipline the employee after an 
investigatory interview conducted in accordance with the employee's 
section 7 rights to impose discipline without an interview on the ba­
sis of evidence gathered independently of the unlawful interview.331 
The Board's application of the make-whole remedy to discipline 
following Weingarten-violative interviews has been criticized by sev­
eral courts of appeal, particularly the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit. In denying enforcement of a make-whole 
remedy in NLRB Y. Potier Electric Signal Co. ,332 that court found 
that section lO(c) of the Act barred restoration of the status quo ante 
in any case where the discharge was not in retaliation for the exercise 
of Weingarten rights, but rather, based on the underlying misconduct 
which was the subject of the investigation: 
While the Board has broad authority to restore the status quo and 
make whole any losses suffered by the employees because of un­
fair labor practices, ... it does not have the power to order rein­
statement or back pay for employees' discharged for obvious 
329. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 110 L.R.R.M. 1416, 1417 
n.2 (1982) (Member Jenkins, concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
330. The burden of going forward with evidence to show that the employer affirm­
atively relied upon the employee's failure to offer a satisfactory explanation thus rests 
with the Board's General Counsel, who must rebut the employer's evidence that the dis­
cipline would have occurred absent the unlawful interview. 
331. Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 91, 96 (1980). 
332. 600 F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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personal misconduct, because t() do so would violate Section l(c) 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard.333 
While the Eighth Circuit appears to be of the opinion that resto­
ration of the status quo ante is barred absolutely by section lO(c), the 
Seventh Circuit has taken a less restrictive view. In Illinois Bell Tele­
333. Id See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Ac­
cord Montgomery Ward & Co., 664 F.2d 1095 (8th cii-. 1981). 
Fibreboard involved the application of a make-whole remedy ordering reinstate­
ment of employees laid-off pursuant to a decision to subcontract unit work. The lay-off 
decision violated the employer's duty to bargain in good faith with the union. The 
Supreme Court rejected the employer's contention that the layoff nonetheless was for 
cause and therefore outside the scope of the Board's remedial authority as limited by 
section lO(c). 379 U.S. at 217. The Supreme Court found that the layoff stemmed di­
rectly from the unfair labor practice and was, therefore, within the scope of the Board's 
remedial authority. Id In distinguishing Fibreboard, the Eighth Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court's view that section 10(c) was designed to preclude the Board from rein­
stating individuals discharged for misconduct. 664 F.2d at 1097. The Supreme Court in 
Fibreboard expressed this view by quoting a report ofthe United States House of Repre­
sentatives. The Court said: 
The House Report states that the provision was intended to put an end to 
the belief, now widely held and certainly justified by the Board's decision, that 
engaging in union activities carries with it a license to loaf, wander about the 
plants, refuse to work, waste time, break rules, and engage in incivilities and 
other disorders and misconduct. 
379 U.S. at 217 	n.ll (quoting H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1947». 
The Conference Report notes that under § lO(c) employees who are discharged 
or suspended for interfering with other employees at work, whether or not in 
order to transact union business, or for engaging in activities, whether or not 
union activities, contrary to shop rules, or for Communist activities, or for other 
cause [interfering with war production) ... will not be entitled to 
reinstatement. 
379 U.S. at 217 n.ll (quoting H. R. CONF. REp. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1947). 
As expressed in the above footnote, the legislative history of section lO(c) indicates 
the concern of Congress that union activity not be a shield against that which is otherwise 
a discharge or suspension for cause. It recognizes the obvious fact that a discharge or 
suspension for cause does not entail an illegal motive or constitute an unfair labor prac­
tice. Section lO(c) would also appear to bar reinstatement for discharges or suspensions 
for cause which, because of their impact on organizational rights, could be interpreted as 
unfair labor practices. This may occur where an employee's union activity also consti­
tutes misconduct and where the discharge or suspension of a union activist for what 
would otherwise be cause is, nonetheless, viewed as restraint and coercion of the section 7 
rights of other unit employees solely by virtue of the activist's removal from the work­
place. In neither case does the discipline "[stem) directly from an unfair labor practice 
...." 379 U.S. at 217. Discipline, however, which is based on infomiation obtained 
during a Weingarten-violative interview does stem directly from an unfair labor practice 
and therefore falls within the scope of the Board's remedial authority as interpreted in 
Fibreboard. The Eighth Circuit's holding that section lO(c) bars reinstatement in all 
cases where discipline is for cause based on personal misconduct represents an overly 
restrictive reading ofFibreboard and an overly broad reading of the legislative history of 
section 1O(c). 
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phone & Telegraph Co. ,334 that court remanded the reinstatement is­
sue to the Board for the purpose of determining whether the 
discipline of the employee stemmed solely from the unlawful inter­
view.335 The court reasoned that restoration of the status quo ante 
would be inappropriate where the employer could establish that the 
discipline "is and was supported by other independent evidence 
which was available to the Company at the time of the discharge."336 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has apparently 
adopted the Seventh Circuit's analysis. In General Motors Corp. v. 
NLRB,337 the court refused to enforce a make-whole remedy on the 
grounds that evidence gathered before an unlawful interview repre­
sented independent evidence of good cause for the discharge and 
that, while the employer had not discharged the employee on the 
basis of that evidence alone, it could have.338 
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits do not 
treat section lO(c) as an absolute bar to a make-whole remedy for 
discipline based on Weingarten-violative interviews. However, hold­
ing that such a remedy is inappropriate where there exists independ­
ent evidence which could otherwise support the discipline severely 
restricts the Board's authority to remedy the effects of unfair labor 
practices. Given that information obtained during an unlawful in­
terview is a determinative factor in the discipline, the necessary 
causal relationship between the unfair labor practice and the disci­
pline exists. The information need not be the sole basis. Given a 
disciplinary decision based on information obtained during an un­
lawful interview, it matters not whether there exists other informa­
tion upon which the employer could have relied, since such evidence 
cannot alter what is, in fact, a causal relationship between the inter­
view and the discipline. However, what is relevant, in terms of es­
tablishing whether the causal relationship exists at all, is whether the 
employer would have relied on such independent evidence as a basis 
for the discharge in the absence of the unlawful interview. Thus, 
under a proper analysis, it is insufficient for the employer to prove 
that the discipline did not stem solely from the interview. To the 
334. 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982). 
335. Id at 623. 
336. Id 
337. 674 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1982). 
338. Id at 578. Former Member Truesdale took a similar view. See Texaco Inc., 
251 N.L.R.B. 633, 638 (1980) (former Member Truesdale, dissenting); Southern Bell Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1194, 1194 (1980) (former Member Truesdale, dissenting in 
part), enforcement denied in part, 676 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1980). 
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contrary, the employer's burden should be to prove that the disci­
pline stemmed solely from the independent evidence; meaning that 
the discipline would have occurred, in fact, absent the unlawful in­
terview. In only this sense can it be established that the unfair labor 
practice was not a cause of the discipline.339 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Weingarten, section 7 of 
the National Labo~ Relations Act is designed to "redress the per­
ceived imbalance of economic power between labor and manage­
ment,"340 by guaranteeing employees, inter alia, the right to act in 
concert for mutual aid or protection. Situations in which employees 
seek the aid of their designated bargaining representative or fellow 
employees in order to protect or advance their job interests and eco­
nomic well being vis-a-vis their employer are limitless. The Wein­
garten right constitutes an interpretation of section 7 designed to 
address only one of these situations-where the employee reason­
ably fears that discipline will result from an interview or meeting 
with his employer. 
While the section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mu­
tual aid or protection is, by its terms, a broad right, its application 
necessarily entails a balancing of the countervailing interests of em­
ployers and employees. In Weingarten, that balance was struck in 
favor of the interests of employees in a manner which gave full 
recognition to the statutory policies underlying section 7. In apply­
ing the Weingarten right as enunciated by the Supreme Court, I be­
lieve that the Board has fared well by continuing to interpret section 
7 to its full scope as it relates to requests for representation at meet­
ings or interviews in which the reasonable fear of discipline obtains. 
Materials Research,341 Pac!fic Telephone,342 and Climax Molybde­
num ,343 all entail interpretations of the scope of section 7 which are 
consistent with and fully serve its underlying statutory policy. They 
339. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 826 (1981), enforcement denied in 
pari, 664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981). There, a Board panel found that the employer had 
failed to meet its burden under Kraft Foods. Id Inasmuch as the employee admitted to 
theft at the unfair labor practice hearing, however, the panel majority composed of 
Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins found that the employee had forfeited his right 
to reinstatement and ordered backpay only up until the date of his admission. Id 
340. 420 U.S. at 262 (quoting American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 
316 (1965». 
341. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text. 
342. See supra notes 284-94 and accompanying text. 
343. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text. 
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provide employees, through concerted action, a measure of protec­
tion against employer action which threatens job tenure. 
The Board has had difficulty, however, in applying Weingarten 
to the particular circumstances which arise in various cases. In Coca­
Cola,344 Pac!ftc Gas & Electric,345 and Roadway Express,346 the 
Board, in balancing the competing interests of the employer and em­
ployee under the facts of each case, struck the balance so heavily in 
favor of the employer's interests that it totally denied the employee 
any right to seek protection against action harmful to his job inter­
ests. That, on occasion, the Board has erred in striking the balance 
between employers and employees in its application of Weingarten is 
understandable. Weingarten cases hardly ever present the same set 
of facts. Thus the Board is called upon to continually weigh the in­
terests of employers and employees and adjust the balance under­
taken in Weingarten where it feels that such adjustment is required 
by the particular circumstance of any case. That the Board has done 
so is nothing more than an exercise of its "special function of apply­
ing the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial 
life."347 And it is those complexities.which, at times, make the Wein­
garten right a difficult one to grasp. 
344. See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text . 
. 346. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text. 
347. 420 U.S. at 266. 
